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ABSTRACT
l\Hien infants, were allowed to fixate their own mother’s face under 
various degrees of completeness, all showed differential fixation.
A face without both eyes was fixated significantly less frequently than 
were the eyes only with or without other facial features and was also 
associated \d.th a negative reaction of actively refusing to look. A full 
or complete face, however, was not fixated any more frequently than an 
incomplete which contained eyes.
In another study, infants were allowed to fixate two television 
monitors.on which were simultaneously presented filmed versions of a 
strange female face under various degrees of completeness. In spite 
of decided positional preferences, the results of the two studies 
correlated significantly, which indicates that infants responded to 
a filmed version of a face as face-like. It was therefore suggested that 
the human face as a visual stimulus can be conceived to be built up in 
the manner of a heterogeneous summation effect organized around a 
privileged feature, namely, one eye.
The literature on imprinting was reviewed and the rreniai»
between the minimally sufficient and the optimal conditions was dravm. 
Moreover, different types of imprinting were argued for. Then the 
development of attachment in the human infant, with particular reference 
to perception of the human face, was compared with imprinted recognition 
of and response to visual stimuli in birds, and it was pointed out that 
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PART I
INFANTILE PERCEPTION:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century, the problem of perception in the human 
neonate had not been raised. While the majority of the population 
(psychologists included) considered infants to be sightless, a few 
physiologists and physicians were willing to ascribe to infants at least 
the mechanisms of vision. Early experiments were concerned with an 
infant’s ability to distinguish colours, to fixate and/or track a stimulus 
object or light and to dilate the pupil. Before 1958, there had only 
been a handful of empirical studies concerned with vision and perception 
in the infant. The major hindrance to research was the lack of experimental 
techniques. The human infant presented the same perennial practical and 
theoretical problems as chimpanzees, rats or other non-verbal organisms: 
n a m e l y ’’How does an observer know what an organism perceives if it cannot 
speak?”. Obviously, special techniques are needed. It was not until after 
the middle of the century that appropriate techniques had been developed.
It was as late as 1964 that publications concerning infantile vision and 
perception became a regular occurrence in the technical journals.
Nevertheless, only a dozen or so publications concerning perception of the 
human face have appeared to date.
Since the human face as a stimulus is a complex pattern and since 
perception in general is dependent upon physiological mechanisms, it is 
impossible to separate the problems of perception of the human face from 
those of vision or perception in general. Therefore, all relevant 
publications have been reviewed. .
Each research published has been classified in one of thirteen categories.* 
Methodology, physiology, pharmacology, handling, motility, fixation, 
colour perception, pattern perception, face perception, depth perception, 
habituation, sex differences, cognition. Each research reviewed has been 
introduced by a bracketed heading which indicates its content. Reviews 
have been grouped according to year of publication and arranged chronologically, 
Researches published prior to 1958 constitute the first section; those 
including and subsequent to that year, the second, A final section presents 
a summary of the work reviewed.
^Physiological researches have been included because of their relevance 
to the problem of determining criteria of fixation. Studies of fixation, 
habituation and cognition have been selected because of their relevance 
to methodological issues.
EARLY STUDIES ON INFANTILE PERCEPTION
1913
[colour perception] One of the first empirical studies on vision in 
the human infant was carried out by Valentine (1913). His sample consisted 
of one infant tested at 4 and 8 months of age with pairs of Holmgrens 
wools (used in testing colour blindness). At 4 months, a record was made 
of the amount of time the infant spent gazing at one of two colours.
At 8 months, the infant was allowed to grasp one of two wools (His 
grasp was then considered to represent his preference.) As a result of 
these experiments, Valentine considered there to be good evidence that by 
3 months an infant can experience sensation of colour and in the following 
order of decreasing preference: 1) yellow, 2) white and pink, 3) red,
4) brown and black, 5) blue and green, 6) violet. Though this order of 
preference seemed to be at least partially determined by brightness,
Valentine was of the opinion it could not be explained entirely ty reference 
to brightness but by the "relative powers of the various colours as stimuli 
to the organism". By 7 months, yellow was the most preferred colour, 
though white had decreased in attractiveness to last, (comparable with 
violetJ while red and pink were the second most preferred.
Obviously, Valentine's experiments have many limitations. A population 
sample of only one infant is too small. Moreover, it is now questionable 
whether accurate fixation can be determined merely from eye or head 
orientation. Likewise, grasping at a coloured bit of material does not 
necessarily indicate visual preference. In short, too many variables were 
left uncontrolled. Nonetheless, Valentine's study is of considerable 
importance for it^posed the problem of infantile vision, and, in particular, 
of colour perception, in its first testable formulation.
1925
[physiology] In contrast to Valentine who studied perception via 
behaviour, Sherman and Sherman (1925) concerned themselves with the 
physiological mechanisms of infantile perception. They observed 23 neonates, 
aged 30 minutes to 33 hours, when light was "thrown into the eye". A pupilary 
response was found to be present, though in a very sluggish form, from about 
3| hours and to become increasingly adequate up to the age of thirty hours 
by which time it was described as "good".
1929
[physiology] Another early study involving the pupilary reflex was 
carried out by Guernsey (1929), who observed 25 infants, aged from 8 
hours to 6 months. She noted that the average size of the pupil increases
with age and that rapid pupilary adjustment is markedly less for the infant
than for the adult. What she considered to be unco-ordinated horizontal 
eye movements occurred in 60% of the infants under 2 weeks; the amount 
dropped to 30% by 6 weeks. The blinking reflex occurred in 80% of the 
infants tested, though only in response to contacts or intense stimulation, 
Guernsey was unable, however, to observe what she considered fixation before 
the second month
Unfortunately due to primitive techniques, Guernsey’s results led her 
to conclude that an infant’s visual reflexes are much less developed than 
was to be indicated by later, more refined studies. Like Sherman and
Sherman (1925), she receives the credit of being one of the first to
document mechanisms which could be considered to provide a physiological 
substrate for vision in the human infant.
1930
[physiology methodology] McGinnis (1930) published a comprehensive 
review and bibliography of the early literature on the optic nystagmus, 
on co-ordinated eye movements and pursuit, and on early experimental and 
recording techniques. As a result of his observations and experiments on 
6 infants during the first 6 weeks of life, he noted the optic nystagmus 
to occur the first time each subject opened its eyes (even during the 
first 12 hours after birth) and to be composed both of large saccadic 
eye-movements and of slow, gliding, pursuit movements. A few infrequent 
co-ordinated eye-movements were seen to occur within a few days after 
birth. Moreover, the number of eye movements was correlated with (ie.mfkenced 
by) the nature of the visual stimulus to which the infant was attending.
McGinnis observed successful ocular pursuit to occur towards the end of 
the second week, i.e., well in advance of Guernsey’s (1929) observation of its 
first occurrence. However, with increasing age, ocular pursuit and 
orientation of the head to a moving stimulus were observed to be more 
frequent and more successful and by 6 weeks to attain many of the 
characteristics of adult visual behaviour, i.e. ’’practically free of gross 
ocular movements which do not correspond with the movements of the stimulus". 
The number of ocular adjustments in pursuit of a moving object was observed 
to be inversely related to the speed of the object. Yet, the proportion
of eye movements in the correct direction was found to be usually greater 
for the relatively more rapid movement of stimuli used in the experiment 
than for the slower.
1932
[colour perception] Staples (1932) studied the reactions of 252 
infants, aged from 69 days (i.e., approximately 2 months) to 24 months, 
to equally bright cards of red, yellow, green, blue and grey, each colour 
paired with every other. The preferences of older infants were determined 
by the coloured card grasped; of younger infants, by amount of looking. 
Like Valentine (1913), Staples was unable to find behavioural evidence for 
the perception of colour as distinct from grey before the 3rd month,, 
after which red appeared to be the most effective, followed by yellow, blue 
and then green. Staples believed there to be a sex difference in response 
to colours, with female infants showing a earlier preference for blue and 
green than the male. In spite of the fact that infants younger than 6 
months did not show preferences for any colours, it does not follow that 
they cannot differentiate them or are colour blind. Unfortunately, 
unpatterned, homogeneous colours were used as stimuli. More recent studies 
tend to indicate that form and not colour per se is a crucial faction in 
eliciting an infant’s attention.'
1933
[physiology] Beasley (1933) attempted to study visual pursuit in 109 
white and 142 negro newborn infants, aged from a few hours to 12 days. 
Unfortunately, due to primitive design and ambiguous statistics few 
conclusive results were obtained. Visual pursuit was observed with varying 
frequencies at different ages. Negro children may have exhibited a greater 
relative frequency of pursuit than whites, though not of higher "quality". 
Beasley argued for unambiguous signs of learning,maturation or functional 
improvement,even thought the results could "not be graphed in the manner 
of the conventional ’learning curve”’.
1934
[motility] Weiss (1934) conducted a series of experiments in which 
she noted that mild auditory and visual stimuli presented simultaneously 
tend to reduce activity of newborns in proportion to the intensities of the 
stimuli used. When different levels of illumination alone (i.e. without 
sound) constituted the stimulus variables, activity was observed to be 
greatest under minimal and least under moderate light. (Moderate 
illumination was the strongest illumination used in the study.) To the 
contrary, crying was greatest under minimal and least under.moderate light.
010
These results were contributed by 90 infants ranging in age from birth up 
to approximately 10 days. A further 67 infants of similar ages were 
observed under darkness (Irin & Weiss, 1934). Activity was found not to be 
maximum in darkness. A preliminary period of darkness tended to be 
followed by an increased amount of activity under minimal light intensities; 
to the contrary, decrement in activity followed under dim and moderate 
light intensities.
Unfortunately, the results of Weiss* experiments have little to offer 
a student who is concerned with perception as an autonomous activity.
1936
[fixation] Gesell and associates produced four publications (1936, 1940, 
1947, 1949) which deal in part or in entirety with the development of 
perception. In contrast to later researchers, Gesell et al focused on the 
localization of stimuli, and on the use of perception to direct motor 
activities but not on differential visual responses to the patterned 
quality of stimuli. Descriptive age norms were obtained as a result of 
patient observations and ingenious experiments of a game like nature. The 
development of an infant’s gross visual responses were beautifully 
documented.
• ■ .. .. 1937 - ■
[cognition] Piaget (1937) was concerned with perception as a general 
cognitive activity beyond looking. He viewed perception not as intrinsic 
but as a result of interaction, i.e., perception is of a reality constructed 
by the actions of a child and the reactions of the environment to him.
For Piaget, the neonate is only sensitive to light in a reflexive or 
passive way. When a stimulus moves, the neonate is described as exhibiting 
merely an attempt to follow it. However, at one month or thereabouts Piaget 
places thebeginning ofthePrimary Circular Reaction. ’’Looking' of a primitive 
variety takes place. The infant now makes ’’active accommoda tory attempts’’ 
to fixate stationary and even to follow moving objects. But it is looking 
for its own sake, i.e. looking to look, in other words, looking to receive 
visual sensation. But Piaget considers looking at this stage to lack 
intentionalityand environmental orientation. However, by the 4th month, 
the infant becomes interested in the surrounding milieu in so far as it 
affects him as a result of his actions. Piaget describes ’’motor'recognition"
11
and motor activities for "many interesting sights last". In short, 
perception is autocentric, i.e., it is concerned more with its own function 
or with the self than with the environment. Time, intentionality and 
anticipation do not come until the Secondary Circular Reaction at 8 months, 
from which period on, Piaget is concerned exclusively with perception as 
something far beyond looking.
1939
[motility] In agreement with Weiss (1934), Redfield (1939) concluded 
as a result of her work with 180 newborns that light has an inhibitory effect 
upon bodily activity and that the inhibitory effect becomes progressively 
greater as intensities increase. Sensitivity to light was observed to 
increase proportionally to the length of the proceeding period in darkness. 
Crying was found to be inhibited by light more effectively after longer 
periods of dark adaptation.
1941
[pattern perception] One of the first experimental studies of vision 
in the infant to concern itself with form perception was carried out by
Ling (1941). In an intensive set of experiments, 14 infants between the
ages of 6 and 12 months were trained to reach for geometrical solids.
As early as 6 months, infants proved capable of using discrimination as
a learning cue in establishing definite approach (or selection) and 
avoidance habits. Individual differences were very marked and consistent 
throughout the whole of the study. Neither changes in relative position, 
spatial orientation, nor size, had much effect on discriminability.
However, as number of stimuli (blocks) presented simultaneously were increased, 
discrimination appeared to become more difficult. Similar stimuli were most 
difficult to be discriminated when presented in close proximity. Though 
sudden reversals of functional relationships between positive and negative 
stimuli caused temporary confusion, adaptation occurred very soon and 
sometimes with what Ling described as "insight". Positional cues were 
sought by infants only at the beginning of the experiments or when 
temporarily confused. Ling considered the factors affecting discrimination 
in her experiment to occur in the following order of decreasing potency:
1) number, 2) similarity, 3) sequence, 4) proximity, 5) size, 6) orientation 
(in space) and 7) position. In conclusion he observed that "the young 
human infant tends spontaneously to select (i.e. to "prefer") the more 
complex angular forms as opposed to the "primitive" circle form".
1942
[fixation physiology] In a subsequent study. Ling (1942) observed the
responses of 25 full-term infants, aged from 7 minutes to 24 weeks, to 
an approaching/receding disk. Infants tended to respond differently to the 
stimulus when at close range than when farther away. Sustained fixation was 
absent at birth but appeared in a rudimentary form a few hours afterwards 
and reached its peak at about 4 to 5 weeks. Ling characterized the 
development of fixation as follows:
I. Absence of fixation,
II. Dawning of fixation.
III. Sustained near fixation.
IV. Pre-perfect (Variable) fixation.
V. Perfecting sustained fixation (4 to 5 weeks),
VI. Roving fixation.
It is to be noted that what Ling describes as "roving fixation" could 
equally well be described as primitive.visual scanning.
Even neonates inhibited spontaneous movements and adapted the entire 
body to facilitate fixation. Conjugate deviation was considered to be 
functional immediately after birth. Co-ordinated compensatory eye 
movements were likewise observed soon after birth, (though not truly 
efficacious until the 4th or 5th weeks, as mentioned previously). Binocular 
fixation was considered to appear first at7 to 8 weeks. When convergence 
was first observed to occur, it was characterized by a series of globus 
jerks. Frequency of blinking tended to decrease with age, while
palpebral fissures tended to increase; both were related to the intensity 
of the illumination.
1946
[face perception] Spitz (1946, 1948, 1965) was one of the first 
researchers to study the social implications of perception in the human 
infant. He observed that by the third month the infant is "able to 
recognise the human face and to indicate this by smiling". He described 
the acquisition of this responsiveness as an indication of a transition from 
"reception of stimuli coming from the inside to the perception of stimuli 
coming from the outside"; in another formulation by Spitz, "a shift from 
passive to active". However, a careful reading of Spitz's publications 
gives the impression that he seems to consider the smiling response as a 
sufficient and reliable indication of perception, and that he is concerned 
with perception as a general or global process rather than with the way 
in which an infant localizes and discriminates sources of stimulation.
As a result of his observations and naturalistic impromptu experiments. 
Spitz came to the explicit conclusion that the human infant does not
respond to the human face as a face, but rather as a "privileged Gestalt 
... of forehead, eyes, and nose, the whole in movement". He is most 
emphatic that both eyes (presumably open) plus the nasal and supraorbital 
structures must be present to form the "sign Gestalt". In short, the 
head in profile is insufficient. Though Spitz did not state it explicitly, 
he seems to imply,in contrast to Kaila (1932),that an infant at three to 
four months is unable to distinguish the Gestalt of a living face from 
that of a mask or a model. Such an assumption seems to follow from his 
contention that smiling can be evoked equally well by the appropriate 
pattern on a piece of cambric as by a real face and from his above-mentioned 
acceptance of the smiling response as a sufficient and reliable behavioural 
indication of visual perception. Yet, Spitz has also suggested that it is 
the light reflecting property of the eyes which contributes to their 
central position in facial Gestalt. If this is the case, then his concept 
of a "privileged Gestalt" qua Gestalt is in need of revision.
1954
[face perception] Ahrens (1954) undertook a detailed study of the 
specific properties of the face which are requisite to evoke smiling. In 
basic agreement with Spitz, he concluded that eyes are of central 
importance. During the first weeks, only a dot or a primitive equivalent 
for an eye seemed sufficient to evoke smiling. However, the actual eye 
configuration plus nose and forehead became increasingly necessary 
especially by the third to fourth months. Likewise,the outline seemed to 
acquire significance with increasing age. As stimuli, Ahrens used masks 
and marked cards, as well as actual faces, and found, contrary to Spitz, 
that at about 4 months the two could be distinguished. In addition, he 
noted that a configuration of face with eyes evoked more smiling than that 
of one vnthout. Artificial eyes worn on a real face evoked smiling from 
infants up to 5 or 6 months, after which time they elicited negative • 
responses.
It is important to stress that neither was Ahrens directly concerned 
with perception in the narrower sense of the term. However, it is obvious 
that his findings, as well as those of Spitz, can be extrapolated to 
conclusions about the development of looking: whatever evokes social
smiling must be seen, heard, felt or in some way sensed. Unfortunately, 
smiling is neither a reliable nor a sufficient single criterion 
to be used in more refined and more specialized study of an infant's 
perception of the face. Ambrose (1961), Wolff (1963) and others (Brackbill, 
1958; Gewirtz/ 1965) have done rigorous studies on smiling per se and
offer evidence that smiling is a very complex set of responses, is highly 
influenced by the present environment as well as by the past history of 
the individual infant, and must be considered differently according to 
the particular stage of development and the momentary somatic and 
emotional state of a given infant.
[methodology, physiology] Schwarting (1954) studied the smallest wire 
moving across an illuminated field which would elicit a "following reflex" 
in a series of normal infants. He approximated normal visual acuity at 
3 months to be "finger counting" (Snellen), 6 months 20/400, 12 months 
20/200. However, Schwarting's results were limited by primitive methodology 
and experimental apparatus.
1955
[physiology] Zetterstrom (1955) recorded flicker electro-retinograms 
for 35 infants, aged from birth to 8 weeks. No flicker was obtained for 
infants within 24 hours of birth; however, by 2 - 3 days a measurable 
flicker was obtained for every infant tested. Flicker frequency rose 
rapidly during the first weeks of life and by 8 weeks was comparable to 
an adult's record. "
1957
[physiology, methodology] Gorman, Cogan and Gfillis (1957) described 
an apparatus for "grading visual acuity by means of the opticokinetic 
response" and determined 93 newborns aged l| hours to 5 days to perceive 
a pattern which corresponds to a minimal Snellen notation of 20/670. In 
other words, newborn infants are definitely not blind. Gorman, Cogan and Gillis 
suggested that under optimal testing conditions this index may be found 
to be lower, as subsequently proved to be the case.
Contemporary Studies of Infantile Perception, with Special Reference
to the Perception of Form in General and of the Human Face in Particular.
1958
[methodology, pattern perception] With Fantz' 1958 publication, 
infantile perceptual research took on a new direction. Fantz assumed 
that when the reflection of a pattern coincides with the pupil of the eye, 
the pattern can be considered to be fixated. Twenty-two infants were seen 
between one and 20 weeks. They were allowed to fixate pairs of stimuli; 
a cross and a circle equated in area; two identical triangles; a 
checkerboard and a homogeneous grey square; a bull's eye and stripes, 
equated in area. Though there were position preferences, Fantz felt it was 
possible to come to 3 conclusions.
1) differential fixation is possible within the first 20 weeks of life.
2) changes in frequency of fixation are independent of amount of 
testing, i.e. there were developmental changes.
3) consistent visual preferences are present as early as the first 
two months (if one assumes length of fixation to he an indication 
of preference). For example, infants younger than 8 weeks 
"preferred" stripes while older preferred a bull's eye.
[pattern perception] Berlyne (1958) conducted an experiment in which 
14 infants ranging in age from 3 to 9 months were presented with pairs of 
stimuli. The stimulus gazed at first was considered to be preferred,
Berlyne noted that "the two patterns in the complexity series that were 
especially attractive were ones with much more contour than others in the 
same series", Berlyne made no published reference to positional preferences, 
which usually plague the paired stimuli method. Though Berlyne's results 
are comptatible with those of later studies, his basic assumption that the 
stimulus to which an infant first looks is preferred is of doubtful 
tenability. For this to be the case, infants would have to have peripheral 
vision developed to such a degree that it would be possible to respond to 
both stimuli before directly looking at either one of the pair. Positional 
preference above all makes such a first choice unlikely, even if peripheral 
perception were sufficiently developed in the younger infants. Moreover, 
the age range of the sample was too diverse; the visual development of a 
three-month infant is unlikely to be comparable to that of a nine-month.
1961
[physiology] Pendleton and Paine (1961) made electro-oculographic and 
photographic recordings of the vestibular nystagmus. Rotational and post 
rotational nystagmi were obtainable in all normal full-term infants and 
in most normal prematures, but only if the infant was thoroughly awake in 
both cases. Only tonic deviation of the eyes without the quick component 
of the nystagmus could be obtained from a sleepy, satiated or abnormal 
infant. No response to rotation, not even forced deviation, was considered 
a sign of grave abnormality.
[colour, pattern and face perception] Fantz (1961a, 1963) presented 
infants with stimuli singly and in a random order. An infant was allowed 
to look at a stimulus as long as he wished; when he looked away, a new 
stimulus was presented. For younger infants (under 5 days), a schematic 
face was reported to have been more frequently fixated than a bulls-eye. 
However, Fantz (1965) was unable to obtain similar results when he later 
repeated the experiment. Both'the schematic face and the bulls-eye
elicited greater fixation than did newsprint or pure colour. By contrast, 
infants of 2 - 6 months showed a decided preference for the schematic 
face. The bulls-eye and the newsprint were now about equally preferred. 
Colour was still least preferred. Fantz concluded that infants "act as 
if patterns are innately perceivable and are intrinsically interesting.
While colour and brightness without patterning offer little to attract 
their attention". When a schematic was compared with a scrambled face, 
the schematic face was always more frequently fixated though the difference 
was not always great and no statistical test was employed. Fantz did note 
that a preference for face-like patterns of greater complexity increased 
with age and that at 3 months there was a decrease in the size of the 
difference between the amount of fixation for a scrambed and a schematic face.
1962
[physiology, pattern perception] A further publication by Fantz in 
co-authorship with J. M. Ordy and M. S. Udelf appeared in 1962. Relative 
measures of visual acuity were established for young infants. A card 
containing vertical black and white stripes was found to be preferred to 
a homogeneous grey card of equal over-all light reflectance. Infants up 
tb 2 months could resolve 40 minutes of visual angle; infants from 2 
to 4 months, 20 minutes; and infants from 4 to 6, 10 minutes. When 
intensities of illumination were compared, a moderately bright illumination 
(20 foot candles) was preferred.
1964
[pharmacology, pattern and face perception] Shecl^ler (1964)
investigated the effects of medication during labour on neonatal attention. 
Twenty full-term infants from 2 to 4 days old were exposed to a random 
order of 3 stimuli: a schematic face; drawing of one die; a blank or
homogeneous field. Infants whose mothers had received heavy medication 
were less attentive than those whose mothers had received light. Moreover, 
there was a significant negative correlation between the time of drug 
administration in relationship to birth and total looking time; "the 
more drugs administered closer to delivery the less attentive is the infant 
likely to be". The more complex of the two stimuli, a schematic face, 
was fixated longest.
[handling] White and Castle (1964) studied the effects of handling on 
the development of visual exploration. Ten institutionally-reared infants 
were given 20 minutes of extra handling each day for one month, starting 
with the sixth month. When compared with infants who were from the same 
institution but who received no extra handling, the handled infants showed
"significantly more interest in the environment" than the non-handled 
controls.
[physiology] Dayton, Jones, Aiu, Rawson, Steele and Rose (1964) 
studied the responses of 13 infants aged 8 hours to 8 days to a moving 
target. Electro-oculography combined with direct observation of the 
optokinetic nystagmus indicated that some new born infants are capable of 
more refined visual acuit than found by Schwarting (1954) who used a 
more primitive technique of measurement. In fact, Dayton et al observed 
that some neonates possess a visual acuity of at least 20/150 as well as 
a developed fixation reflex with conjugate eye movements.
[physiology] In a second study, Dayton, Jones, Steele & Rose (1964) 
studied 30 infants, aged 8 hours to 10 days, of which 17 demonstrated a fixation 
reflex with both eyes moving in close conjugation. They pointed out that 
their finding was contrary to McGinnis (1930) and that their results point 
to "an innately more highly developed fixation reflex in the newborn than 
heretofore realized".
[physiology] Dayton collaborated with Jones (1964) in a third study.
Again direct current electo-oculography was used to study the development 
ot the fixation reflex. 127 infants, aged from birth to 6 months, gave 
163 recordings of which 62 demonstrated definite fixation. The number and 
amplitude of refixation movements for infants was greater than for adults, 
who, by contrast, could trace a target very smoothly. The greatest 
decrease in amplitude of refixation occurred during the first 10 days of 
life. Conjugation of both eyes was good from the first day. According to 
Dayton and Jones, the previously held conclusion that the newborn was 
incapable'of purposeful eye movements probably resulted from a misinterpretation 
of the many refixations of large amplitude which are to be observed.
[depth perception] Bower (1964) trained 9 infants, 3 months of age, 
to turn their head in response to various sized cubes which were presented 
at differing distances. Infants appeared not to respond to the size of the 
retinal image but to use depth perception to discriminate the objects.
Bower pointai out that his findings do not support a hypothesis to the effect 
that depth discrimination is dependent on prior action in space. Rather 
"the initial phases of perceptual differentiation is certainly independent 
of action".
[pattern perception] Muns$nger and Weir (1964) conducted an experiment 
with 32 children, aged 9 to 41 months (medium age 24 months) in which 
stimuli of 4 increasingly complex levels of variability were presented in 
pairs. Munsenger and Weir found no change either with exposure or with age.
They claimed that the relationship between complexity and preference was 
not characterized by an inverted U-shaped function but rather by an 
increasing linear function of stimulus complexity. However, due to missing 
data and other technical limitations this reviewer would not take the 
findings of the Munsinger and Weir study as conclusive without further 
experimentation. Above all, the visual behaviour of a 9 months old child 
and a 3| year old child are not comparable.
[pattern perception] Hershenson (1964) investigated the fixation 
preferences of 36 neonates, aged 2 to 4 days, for stimuli varying 
independently in brightness and in complexity. An inverted U-shaped 
relationship between brightness and frequency of fixation was obtained and 
was interpreted as indicating a preference for illumination of intermediate 
intensity. Preferences were ordered transitively, with the least degree 
of complexity the most preferred; "however, only the extremes of complexity, 
least and most complex were significantly different". Hershenson noted apropos 
Fantz that "it is not possible to state whether the crucial dimensions 
underlying the preferences were those classified as contributing to 
"pattern" or whether they were more "primitive in nature". He pointed out 
that the patterned stimuli used frequently in previous studies were also 
ones of intermediate brightness. He concluded that results of such 
experiments are frequently "ambiguous in terms of their pertinence for a 
general theory of perceptual development". Unfortunately there have been no 
experiments todate which would indicate whether there is differential 
fixation of different comply patterns of equal intermediate brightness.
[colour and pattern perception] Spears (1964) used relative fixation 
time to assess visual preference and discrimination. Six separate 
experiments were run, each composed of 10 infants aged 4 months. Contrary 
to Staples (1932), Myers (1908), and Valentine (1914), only blue and red 
were "preferred" to a grey of equal or greater brightness, but not to 
yellow. There was no "preferential" difference obtained for other 
colours. Shape appeared to dominate colour as a basis for choice, i.e. 
"preference for shpae is not necessarily dependent on colour". Spears noted 
that a bull's-eye was preferred to either a diagonal, a checkerboard or a 
hexagonal pattern. These findings are compatible with those of Fantz (1958).
[habituation, colour and form perception] Saayman, Ames and'Moffett
(1964) operationally defined a novel stimulus as one "which has not been 
presented during the familiarization period". Stimuli differed as to form 
only, colour only, or both form and colour. Fifty six infants, most aged from
12 to 15 weeks, were presented with a pair of stimuli for two trials in 
order to determine a base looking-time. Then a familiarization period 
followed in which only one of the two stimuli was presented, usually the 
more preferred. (One group, however, was familiarized on the non-preferred 
stimulus). Afterwards came two further presentations of the original 
paired stimuli. During the familiarization period, all stimuli were 
fixated significantly less frequently as time passed. During the post 
familiarization period, an initially preferred stimulus was fixated 
significantly less than in the pre-familiarization period. There was no 
such decrement for non-preferred stimuli when pre- and post-familiarization 
fixation times were compared. When stimuli differed either in form only 
or in colour only, familiarization had no significant effect on the 
non-familiarized stimulus during the post familiarization period. However, 
when both colour and form differed, the non-familiarized stimulus tended 
to elicit increased fixations. Though evidence for discrimination of 
circles from crosses did not appear in spontaneous visual preferences 
across subjects, this discrimination could be demonstrated (in spite of 
individual preferences) when one stimulus was familiarized, therefore 
making the other stimulus to appear relatively more novel.
1965
[fixation] . Wolff and White (1965) tested for visual pursuit 48 three 
to four-day old infants in the following attentional states: 1) alert
and inactive; 2) waking and active; 3) vigorous pacifier sucking;
4) satiated pacifier suck. It was found that the range of pursuit 
movements was reduced by pacifier sucking since head rotation was 
simultaneously inhibited. However, infants were observed to pursue with 
the eyes "as well as or better while sucking on a pacifier than during 
alert activity and constantly better than during waking activity". (These 
results contradict Bruner's (1968) hypothesis that younger infants are one 
channel organisms and cannot both suck and look at the same time.) Moreover, 
Wolff and White observed that pursuit was better after three minutes of 
sucking had elapsed than just after it had begun.
[fixation] In a second study, Wolff (1965) observed 10 infants over 
the first month and noted a "week by week increase in the total duration 
of alert-inactivity over the first month". Wolff considered alert-inactivity 
as an optimal state "for a 'true assessment' of the environment". At one 
week, approximately 11% of observation time was spent in alert-inactivity; 
by the fourth week, 21%. Wolff found it was possible to prolong the 
attentive state by presenting interesting stimuli. At one week, a state
of alertness could be forcibly increased by 19 minutes, at the fourth week, 
by 37 minutes. The degree of increase was statistically significant, 
[physiology] A study complementary to Wolff’s was carried out by 
Haynes, White and Held (1965). Twenty-two infants, aged 6 days to 4 months, 
were tested with the technique of dynamic retenoscopy. Before 1 month, 
no infant was observed to accommodate to changes in the visual field; 
there appeared to be a fixed focal distance with a median
value of 19 centimetres for the group in question. Images near or farther 
away were out of focus. However, during the second month the accommodative 
system "began to respond adaptively to changes in target distance", and 
bv the 4th month approximated adult performance.
The implications of the Haynes, White and Held (1965) study are of 
enormous importance. Firstly, an infant has very little experience with 
sharply-patterned stimuli during the first month, except perhaps for the • 
human face. Almost all other visual stimuli would be blurred or vague. 
However, by the fourth month, the child's visual experiences are equivalent 
to an adult's. In other words, first the child experiences the facial 
pattern only and then enlarges his perceptual environment to include 
nbn-human Gestalten.
[sex differences, pattern and face perception] Kagan and Lewis
(1965) recorded the responses of 16 male and 16 female infants (seen at 
6 and 13 months) to pictures of faces and geometric designs and to three 
patterns of blinking lights. Measures of attention were 1) total fixation,
2) bodily activity, and 3) cardiac rate. At six months the infants in 
their study "preferred" photographs of faces to a symbolic representation 
of a panda bear. Curiously enough, at 13 months a schematic face elicited 
more fixation than photographs of either male or female faces. Kagan and 
Lewis suggested that this latter finding indicated a developmental increase 
of attention to "partial violations or distortions of familiar patterns". 
However, most perplexing was the finding that the older infants preferred 
the most simple blinking light pattern (a simple repetative point) to a 
less predictable helix. For all infants, an inverse relationship between 
activity and capacity for sustained attention, as measured in this study, 
was found. Moreover, interesting individual differences in attention 
were observable by 6 months.
Nonetheless, Kagan and Lewis felt there were definite sex differences 
to be found in their sample of American infants. They claimed that female 
infants are capable of more sustained attention to visual stimuli and that 
males showed rapid habituation. Assuming that "sustained attention and a
preference for deviations from the familiar are mature attentional habits", 
Kagan and Lewis argue that females are developmentally advanced over males 
as early as the 6th month of life.
[pattern perception] Hershenson, Munsinger and Kessen (1965) published 
a study which yielded results contradictory to a previous study by 
Herschenson (1964). The present study of 17 infants, 2 to 4 days old, 
found a preference for stimuli of intermediate complexity. In fact, 
the least complex experimental stimuli were now least preferred, whereas 
they had been most preferred in the previous study. The authors suggested 
that a variable other than complexity may have contributed to the later 
results. However, they were unable to suggest what the new or extraneous 
variable might be. They did note, however, that the findings of their 
present study were strikingly similar to those of Munsinger and Kessen 
(1964) and therefore may be taken "as partial support for the postulated 
limited capacity of human beings to process environmental variability".
. [pattern and face perception] Another experiment concerned with the 
responses of infants to stimuli of varying degrees of complexity was 
carried out by Thomas (1965). The sample of 49 infants was divided into two ag^ 
groups (younger, 2 - 14 weeks, older, 15 - 26 weeks), and were presented 
with 4 stimuli of varying complexity. In ascending order of complexity, 
these stimuli are; A) an oval with 2 stripes, B) an oval with a checker­
board effect, C) a schematic face, D) an oval with a schematic drawing of 
a clothed female figure.
For the younger infants, all conditions were significantly different 
except for the face and figure. Whereas Fantz (1961a) considered all 
his infants to "prefer" a face-like pattern, a checkerboard effect was 
statistically the most preferred by the younger infants in Thomas’ sample.
For the older infants, however, all conditions were significantly different; 
the face now the most preferred. For both age groups the stripe was the 
least preferred stimulus. There was partial support for the hypothesis 
that older infants fixate more complex stimuli (as defined in this experiment) 
than do younger. Thomas interpreted his findings, contrary to Fantz (1961a), 
.that infants "preferred" the human facial Gestalt "not because of some 
primitive response, but because it was closer to an appropriate complexity 
level .... than were the remaining stimuli". Thomas also pointed out that 
the preference of the face over the checkerboard in his study could have 
resulted from "some learned response to the face stimulus". It is to be 
noted that Thomas' experimental techniques and statistical analyses are 
superior to Fantz' (1961a).
1966
[pattern perception] Another study concerned with stimulus complexity 
as a determinant of visual fixation was published by Brennan, Ames and 
Moore (1966). Their total sample consisted of 30 infants, divided into 
3 age groups. The youngest age group, 3 weeks old, "preferred" patterns 
in decreasing order of complexity; the intermediate, 8 weeks old, "preferred" 
a pattern of intermediate complexity; the oldest, 14 weeks, "preferred" 
patterns in increasing order of complexity. The older an infant, the longer 
it looked at the more complex stimulus, in this case a checkerboard pattern. 
However, an inverse relationship was found between total looking time, 
regardless of condition, and increasing age. The authors noted the 
compatibility of the results of their study with that of Thomas (1965).
They made reference to Salapatek and Kessen (1966) and suggested that the 
developmental preference for increased complexity may be attributed to a 
change in scanning patterns, and that more primitive preferences may be 
limited by the tendency of younger infants not to scan a figure but only 
to fixate parts of it.
[face perception] Watson (1966) conducted three experiments with a 
total of 48 home-reared infants. Four age groups were 7 to 8 weeks, 13 to 
14 weeks, 19 to 20 weeks and 25 to 26 weeks. In the first and second 
experiments, each infant was presented with a moving human head, either 
that of the experimenter or of the infant's own mother, at either 0 degrees,
90 degrees, or 180 degrees rotation. Smiling, the measure in question, 
occurred most frequently to a face of 0 degrees rotation and with optimal 
strength at 13 to 14 weeks, at which age Ambrose (1961) noted a peak in 
smiling for home-reared infants. By contrast, the 90 degree orientation 
showed its peak efficiency at 20 weeks.
In the third experiment, the same infants were presented with either a 
schematic face, a circle with a dot or a circle with a "T". Record of 
total cumulative fixation indicated that the effects of orientation 
appeared only for the schematic face.
Watson concluded that infants under 6 months of age can perceive the 
orientation of the face and that they appear to be more sensitive to a 
change in facial orientation of 90 degrees than to a contrast between the 
face of their own mother and that of a stranger.
[pattern anddepth perception] Bower (1966) reviewed his 1964 article 
and quoted related studies and concluded that "motion paralax was the most 
effective cue to depth, followed by binocular paralax" in the young infant. 
Shape constancy was demonstrated in 3 months old infants. A trapezoid
023
was distinguishable from a slanting rectangle, both of which produced the 
same retinal image. An operant response was the behaviour used to indicate 
the differentiation. Moreover, another experiment gave results which 
would indicate that infants "seem to complete objects as adults do".
Completion occurred only to real objects and not to photographs of them.
In short, eight-week old infants were found capable of depth and orientation 
discrimination and of size and shape constancy but unable to discriminate 
pictorial cues cr to maintain shape constancy and orientation discrimination 
simultaneously. Bower emphasized that perception is the result 
of more than a momentary retinal image. He concluded that there is 
evidence to suggest that "infants can in fact register most of the information 
an adult can register but can handle less of the information than adults 
can".
[methodology, face perception] Kagan, Henker, Hen-Tov, Levine and Lewis 
(1966y*conducted two experiments in which a total of 66, 4 month-old infants 
were presented with four different 3-dimensional representations of a 
human face: a regular, full or natural face; a face in which the eyes,
nose and mouth were re-arranged; a face without eyes; and a blank solid 
with a face-like contour, though without any features. Measures of first 
and total fixation to the regular and rearranged faces were not significantly 
different whereas smiling and decreases in heart rate were significantly 
more frequent to the regular (or natural) face. Vocalization tended to 
increase over trials, whereas fixation tended to decrease,
Kagan et al pointed out that long fixations do not necessarily imply 
"preference", "liking" or "pleasure inducing". If preference is nothing 
more than relatively longer fixation, then nothing is gained by using the 
term "preference" instead of the phrase "relatively longer fixation", for 
a long fixation may reflect either an attempt to reduce uncertainty and to 
categorize an unfamiliar stimulus as well as/or a desire to gaze at a 
pleasing Gestalt. The authors theorized that "fixation time is apt to be 
low to very familiar and very novel patterns but equally high for a band 
of stimuli representing recently formed schema as well as moderate violations 
of these schema". In short, long fixations must be considered ambiguous 
unless complimented by other measures such as smiling, activity or changes 
in heart rate. Unfortunately, measures additional to total fixation did 
not yield any significant results for the study in question. Nonetheless, 
the logical basis of the argument against the interpretation of long 
fixation as preference cannot be denied. One striking result did emerge, . 
however; facial patterns containing eyes (either regular or scrambled)
* In the meantime,Jerome Kagan et al. have brought out a new book Change 
and Continuity in Infancy (John Wiley 1971) in which the 1966 study is 
extended.
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tended to elicit longer fixation than faces without eyes.
[methodology, face perception, sex differences] A similar pair of 
experiments were conducted by Lewis, Kagan and Kalafat (1966). The first 
experiment involved 6 stimuli; photographs of a male and of a female 
face, a schematic line drawing of a male face, a bull’s-eye, a checkerboard, 
and a nursing bottle. The second involved three patterns of blinking lights, 
varying in complexity of movement.
The same 32 infants, 24 weeks of age, served as subjects for both 
experiments.
Measures were taken of 1) first fixation, 2) longest fixation, 3) total 
fixation, 4) number of fixations, 5) latency to first fixation, as well as 
of a) cardiac and respiratory rates, b) activity (as measured by arm and 
head movements) and c) vocalization.
The results of first and total fixations gave ambiguous results; one 
measure sometimes gave a significant result for one sex and not for the 
other. Differences between longest fixation and number of fixations 
were also unclear. An inverse correlation was found between length of 
fixation and number of fixations. However, number of fixations and length 
of fixations are not independent measures and therefore must be correlated. 
Therefore, it is ambiguous whether a high negative correlation is indicative 
of psychological effect or is a statistical artifact. Though none of the 
measures used gave insightful results, Lewis, Kagan and Kalafat maintain with 
some reason the pattern of fixations is as important as lengths of fixation. 
They even went so far as to claim that the "longest and the first fixations 
were better indices of discriminations than was total fixation because 
the human faces were more likely to evoke one or two long fixations, while 
non-facelike designs tended to evoke many shorter fixations". Finally, 
there was evidence for possible sex differences, the meaning of which, 
however, remained ambiguous.
[methodology, habituation, depth, pattern and form perception] In the 
eight years that followed Fantz’ article on "Pattern Vision in Infants" (1958), 
he published a further 6 articles. These articles were reviewed by Fantz 
himself in his classic paper on "Pattern Discrimination and Selective 
Attention as Determinants of Perceptual Development from Birth" (1966)•
Fantz concentrated on the "perceptions vs action" controversy, in which one 
school of thought postulates perception as innate and the other, 
to the contrary, as arising out of action. In contrast to Gesell 
et al (1949), Hebb (1949), and Piaget (1952), Fantz argues that "perception 
precedes action and that early perceptual experience is necessary for the
development of co-ordinated and visually directed behaviour". He continues 
"... learning through past responses will change what is attended to and 
how it is responded to, but these are secondary influences which do not 
create perception or fundamentally alter it. What is perceived, on the 
other hand, is crucial for determining behaviour and for determining what 
is learned from experience at all stages of development, including the 
early months when sensorimotor co-ordination is developing". Fantz mentions 
the well-known difference between localization and discrimination of 
stimuli and reminds the reader that for infants, localization of stimulus 
source is not automatic as it is for adults.
Fantz discusses the methodological problems in testing infants perception 
and argues that looking response can be used "to test discrimination simply 
by comparison of the amount of fixation of different targets exposed in a 
systematic way in a test chamber". Apparently unaware of the criticism by 
Kagan, Henkez, Hen-Tov, Leven and Lewis (1966), Fantz argues as well that 
"consistent differential fixation of different targets on repeated exposures 
with positions varied indicates a visual preference". Fixation is equated 
with the coincidence of the corneal reflection of a stimulus and the pupil 
of the eye, (Fantz suggests in passing that fixation may be an ambiguous 
measure and that first and longest fixations, as well as other behaviours 
such as smiling, ought not to be ignored).
From the 1961 experiment, Fantz concluded that "two configurational 
characteristics of the human face can be perceived and are selectively 
attended to —  the complexity of the patterning of the face starting from 
birth, and the particular arrangements of the features at least by the 
third month". However, he warns that "the results with the particular 
face-like patterns used do not necessarily accurately reflect the 
development of responsiveness to actual faces, since faces have many further 
and varied visual aspects; thus, lack of preference for the schematic 
face might mean not lack of discrimination but the ability to distinguish 
between a real and simulated face".
Infants under two months "preferred" a flat to a solid form, whereas at 
two months a sharp reversal occurred. Fantz considered the reversal to 
indicate both depth discrimination and preferences for 3 dimensional or 
solid figures.
As a result of experiments on early sensory deprivatic Fantz postulated 
a "complex interaction of innate, maturational, and experiential influences 
on the development of pattern selectiveness".
In the last two experiments which Fantz discussed, he studies the effect 
of successive exposures on fixation time. In one experiment 2 stimuli 
were presented singly in alternating exposures. Each exposure consisted 
of 5 repeated presentations of one stimulus. Though Fantz had expected 
fixation to decrease with repeated presentations of one stimulus and to 
increase when the stimulus was changed, this, in fact, did not happen. 
Instead, there was an overall response decrement (though the 3rd and 4th 
and sometimes the 5th fixation appeared to be less than the first and/or 
second for any 5 presentations). The infants in question were 2 to 6 months 
old. In the other experiment, infants were allowed to view either the same 
pattern or varying patterns of the same relative complexity.
Infants of the same age showed a decrease in fixation time to the same 
pattern and a slight increase to the variable pattern. Fantz suggested 
that his results could be interpreted as evidence that infants over 2 months 
can in some sense recognize a pattern they have seen, at least a short time 
before.
"Thus action as well as perception may have an effect on later visual 
behaviour during the early months; the question is that of the degree 
and type of influence of each. It is difficult to imagine how a lasting 
or consequential effect on what is perceived or what is learned from 
experience can result from a general decrease in length of fixation, 
while decreased attention to repeatedly exposed patterns can easily be 
shown to be essential for effective visual exploration and familiarization 
with the environment.
"in the adult organism, and presumably in the infant as well, visual 
exploration allows examination of objects and places of potential importance 
for present or future behaviour. Neither unvarying reflex fixations nore 
completely random fixations will serve this function; visual preferences 
assure both variability and selectiveness in the explorations. At first 
exploration is facilitated by the unlearned pattern selectiveness. 
Eventually, perhaps starting around 2 months of age, the explorations are 
made more efficient by less looking at objects already explored, leaving 
more time to examine unknown objects. The unlearned selectiveness remains 
useful in the selection among novel objects and for preventing complete 
habituation to objects of potential importance for behaviour."
In conclusion Fantz listed some of the following points;
1) From birth onwards, human infants can "see and discriminate patterns 
as the basis of form perception". In comparison to adults, all infant's 
perceptual abilities are limited, yet they are sufficient to permit much
visual experience.
2) "visual patterning is intrinsically stimulating or interesting. It 
elicits much more visual attention from birth than do colour and brightness 
alone". In general, more complex patterns are preferred to the simpler.
3) "At some point, at least by the third month, the unlearned visual 
selectiveness begins to be modified by past visual experience. One of 
the changes is decreased attention to familiar patterns and consequently
increased attention to novel ones",
Fantz considered his findings to give evidence that "in development, 
visual perception precedes action rather than the reverse".
In basic agreement with Gibson and Gibson (1955) Fantz hypothesized 
that perceptial learning may be nothing more than experiential changes in 
selective attention.
Unfortunately, most of Fantz' experiments lack sophisticated design, 
particularly as regards controls, to warrant all the generalizations he makes. 
Above all, the infrequency of statistical tests make it difficult to accept 
as significant certain conclusions, especially when they have not been 
substantiated by other studies.
[physiology] Kiff and Lepard (1966) used the optokinetic nystagmus to 
study the visual development of 44 premature infants, weighing 2 lbs. 7 oz. 
to 5 lbs. 8 oz. Only 24 infants responded to the experimental situation.
A Snellen visual acuity of 20/820 was obtained for the majority of infants 
4 lbs. or over. The earliest response was given by an infant weighing 
3 lbs. 1| oz.
[physiology] BrazeIton, Scholl and Robey (1966) tested 96 neonates
during the first week for ability to fixate and to pursue visually a test 
stimulus. Of normal infants, 57§% evidenced both pursuit and fixation 
while 7% yielded an optokinetic response. Abnormal infants were capable 
of neither.
[motility, fixation] Stechler, Bradford and Levy (1966) also studied 
visual attention in neonates. Fifteen 2 to 6 day old infants showed 
"lower motility and greater reactivity of skin potential while attending to 
a visual target than when equally alert but inattentive". By contrast, 
electrodermal reactivity was enhanced when an infant fixated a target.
This fact was interpreted as indicating that relative motor quiescence 
during fixation is "not simply an indication of overall inhibition".
Stechler, Bradford and Levy considered motor quiescence to be-best compared 
to vigilance in more mature humans.
[fixation] Hafth (1966) focused on the suppression of non-nutritive 
sucking by an intermittent moving stimulus. Forty-one infants, aged 3 to 5 days, 
showed a greater reduction in sucking to experimental than to control 
trials. "No habituation was found with repeated presentations of the 
stimulus". Nor were any sex or age differences related to the suppression 
of sucking rate. In other words, even very young infants like to look and 
will divide their attention between sucking and looking. These results 
are compatible with those of Wolff and White (1965).
[fixation, pattern perception] Another study with neonates was 
carried out by Salapatek and Kessen (1966). Twenty awake, alert neonates, 
aged 7 days or less, were presented with either a homogeneous blank 
field or a large solid central triangle. Infra-red photographs were taken 
of the corneal reflection for one eye only. Visual scanning of a homogeneous 
field tended to be "widely dispersed with a greater dispersion in the 
horizontal than in the vertical dimension", while scanning of a triangle 
was markedly less dispersed, with ocular orientations clustering at one 
of the vertices only and not in the central region of the figure. Infants 
responded only to a part of the stimulus and not to the whole stimulus.
The authors speculated that for very young infants "a preferred figure
may well be one in which there is a predominant number of attractive elements".
[physiology] An attempt to determine an absolute threshold for very 
young infants was carried out by Doris and Cooper (1966). 16 infants, 4
to 69 days old, viewed a field of moving black and white stripes of varying 
intensities. A filmed record was made of each infant's optokinetic 
nystagmus response to the varying intensities of illumination. l#ien 
Weber's fraction and the difference between the black and white stripes 
were calculated, they correlated significantly with age, indicating that 
"brightness sensitivity undergoes rapid development in the first two months 
of life". Doris and Cooper pointed out that their results were compatible 
with those of Fantz, Ordy and Udelf (1962) and of Zetterstrbm (1955), The 
validity of the Weber fraction, however, was called into question because 
of an unforeseen confounding of changes in overall intensity in the stimulus 
pattern. Therefore the experiment was repeated, the results of which were 
published'the following year.
1967
[physiology] Doris, Casper and Poresky (1967) calculated the differential 
brightness thresholds for 10 younger infants, aged 1 to 4 days, and for 
10 older, aged 45 to 113 days. Using the optokinetic nystagmus response 
to a moving field of alternate light and dark-grey stripes, they obtained 
an average Wever fraction of .50 for the younger and of .26 for the older.
This difference was significant and therefore was taken as evidence for 
"rapid development of brightness discrimination in the first months of life". 
The authors speculated that neonates may register half-tones (greys) with 
much loss of detail due to their inability to resolve anything but strong 
contrasts in greys. (While infants of 5 to 6 months, by implication, 
appear to be capable of somewhat more subtle differentiations). If such 
a loss of detail does occur, it would tend to reduce the "meaningfulness" 
of stimuli from the "infant's point of view".
[physiology, methodology] Wickelgren (1967) presented 28 awake 
neonates, aged 2 to 5 days, with pairs of stimuli. Photographs of ocular 
orientation were interpreted as indicating, in contrast to Dayton et al
(1964), that to a large extent a neonate's eyes do not necessarily converge 
upon the same part of a given stimulus or even necessarily upon the same 
stimulus. However, the difference between these two studies appears to 
be one of criteria applied to observations rather than of observations per se. 
Unfortunately, dominant position preferences made it virtually impossible 
to obtain reliable stimulus preferences. In conclusion, Wickelgren 
suggested that variability rather than duration of ocular orientation may 
be a more accurate measure of attention.
[cognition, sex differences, methodology] McCall and Kagan (1967) 
conducted an experiment in which a standard stimulus pattern on a mobile 
was exposed to fifteen first-born infants regularly for one month. The 
experienced or familiarized infants as well as thirty first-born non­
experienced or "naive" infants were tested at the fourth month with the 
standard stimulus and with three stimuli which deviated from it. Magnitude 
of cardiac deceleration for female infants was "an increasing function of 
the degree of discrepancy" between the standardized stimulus and stimuli 
which were graded discrepancies from it. The cardiac responses of male 
infants revealed no such differentiation. McCall and Kagan concluded that 
a stimulus event which "closely matches a schema elicits less deceleration 
than a moderately discrepant event, while a stimulus which is moderately 
discrepant evokes greater deceleration than if the stimulus is completely 
unfamiliar". That is, cardiac deceleration can be used as "an index of the 
dynamic process of matching a new imput to a schema". To explain the sex 
differences, McCall and Kagan speculated that "girls are perceptually 
precocious compared with boys". Measures of fixation were also taken but 
gave no significant results.
[cognition, sex differences] Another experiment using the cardia 
response was carried out by Meyers and Cantor (1967). Twenty-two male and 
an equal number of female infants within one week of six months were 
familiarized with repeated presentations of either a photograph of a ball 
or a clown. Measures of fixation, heart period change (i.e., the difference 
between the pre-stimulus and the old stimulus levels of heart rate) and 
latency of heart period change gave no evidence of response decrements 
during the familiarization period. When a "novel" stimulus was presented, 
heart period latency responses indicated that infants responded differently 
to a familiarized and to a novel stimulus. Males only showed a significantly
larger heart period change to non-familiarized stimuli than to familiarized. 
However, visual fixation times failed to show any differences between 
familiarized and non-familiarized stimuli. Meyers and Cantor noted that 
the deceleration of cardiac response found by them was congruent with similar 
findings by other researchers (Kagan and Rosman, 1964; Lacey, Kagan, Lacey 
and Moss, 1966) that a decrement in heart rate accompanies presentation 
of visual stimuli.
[pattern perception, methodology] Caron (1967) rewarded 22 infants, 
aged 3^ months,with variable patterned stimuli whenever they rotated the 
head in the appropriate direction. Differential reinforcement increased 
head turning in the desired direction. However, when contingent pattern 
stimuli were withdrawn and instead, an imageless stimulus was substituted, 
extinctinction took place. Some infants became angry, fussy, fretted or even 
cried in "protest" to the withdrawal. Caron therefore concluded that 
"it was the opportunity to view an image and not illumination change or 
its accompanying auditory events which maintained the infant’s behaviour" 
and that "the opportunity to view heterogenerous visual patterns is 
reinforcing for infants".
1968
[fixation, cognition] Nelson (1968) presented 21 infants, aged 
42 to 133 days, with repetitions of a left-to-right linear sequence of 
lights. Video-taped records of eye movements indicated that infants show 
"an initial persistent tendency to track only in strings of adjacent lights"^ 
Anticipatory eye movements were noted, suggesting at least a primitive 
form of stored representation or plan which guide eye positioning in a 
visual field temporarily devoid of stimuli. Obviously, four month old 
infants can scan moving stimuli. The question remains, however, whether 
infants scan a non-moving, complex stimulus.
[fixation, pattern perception, methodology] Bruner (1968) reports the 
results of two experiments. In the first experiment, Siqueland 
obtained evidence that three-month old infants would adjust their sucking 
to increase the illumination of a picture projected on a back-lighted screen. 
In the second experiment, Kalnins demonstrated that infants would "work for 
visual clarity" by co-ordinating the "two ordinarily independent activities 
of sucking and looking". Infants one to three-months of age were presented 
with an unfocused picture which they could bring into focus by sucking on 
a pacifier (i.e., dummy). However, if sucking drove a picture out of focus, 
then infants would refrain from the activity even when a pacifier was 
available (i.e., in the mouth).
[face perception] In an experiment by Wilcox and Clayton (1968), ten 
female infants, aged 20 to 23 weeks, were allowed to fixate silent, colour 
motion pictures of a woman’s face either smiling, frowning or neutral in 
expression. All pictures elicited significantly greater amounts of fixation 
than a contrôle stimulus (white light), Moreover, moving faces elicited 
more fixation than non-moving faces. But no differential reactions to facial 
expression were found, Wilcox and Clayton suggested that "movement may be 
an important variable in visual preference regardless of the stimuli used". 
They also noted that their study was unable to find a negative correlation 
between visual fixation and body activity as reported by Kagan and Lewis
(1965).
[habituation] Caron and Caron (1968) recorded the fixation of 50 
3| month-old infants to successive exposures of differing stimuli and of 
the same stimulus. Fixation decreased whenever the same stimulus was 
presented several times in succession, though the degree of decrease was 
least for the most complex stimulus used. In all cases, fixation 
increased whenever a stimulus changed. It is most interesting that infants 
were observed to protest vocally and to become restless when a stimulus 
was repeated. This negative behaviour accompanied decreased fixation.
1969
[pattern perception, habituation, sex differences] Caron and Caron
(1969) extended an experiment published the previous year. Ninety-six infants, 
14 to 16 weeks old, were allowed to fixate varying and repeated exposures 
of visual stimuli, fixation of a given pattern "declined significantly 
during repetition and upon subsequent re-exposure, the amount varying 
inversely, with the complexity of the decrement". Though female infants 
showed a steeper decrement than boys, Caron and Caron considered it 
premature to accept the hypotheses of Kagan and Lewis (1965) and of Kagan, 
Kenker, Hen-Tov, Levine and Lewis (1966) that female infants are 
"maturationally ahead" of male, Caron and Caron did agree, however, with 
Brennan, Ames and Moore (1966) that a relatively more complex pattern is more 
likely "not only to recruit but also to maintain the attention of 14 to 15 
week-old infants",
[pattern perception] Moffett (1969) presented 40 infants, aged 
10 - 14' weeks, with a homogenous field paired with a stimulus pattern.
Stimuli consisted of series of horizontal or vertical stripes of differing 
number and/or arrangement and of square areas created by the intersection 
of the vertical and horizontal stripes. All stripes were black lines on 
a white ground. Infants focused more frequently on patterned stimuli than 
on a homogenous field, "Infants looked longer at patterns with a greater 
number of lines, regardless of whether they were arranged regularly or 
irregularly".
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No "preference" was found for either horizontal or vertical lines, but for 
a combination of the two. A pattern with more (i.e., 16) squares was 
preferred to one with less (i.e., 12); that is: "when the number of parts 
was varied, the number of lines became a less important determinant of 
visual preference". Moffett added that the patterns were probably easily 
resolved since infants invariably preferred the more complex. Moffett's 
findings are compatible with those of most previous experiments.
Unfortunately, few new conclussions were reached,
[face perception] A more sophisticated version of the Wilcox and 
Clayton 1968 study was carried out by Wilcox alone the following year (1969). 
In the later study, she took measures of total and first fixation for 30 
infants, aged either 4, 10 or 16 weeks, in response to 7 pictures of 
faces: a photograph; a realistic drawing; schematic drawings of a complete,
of 3 incomplete, and of a scrambled face. No significant difference between 
the schematic and the scrambled faces were found at any age levels. Neither 
the presence nor absence of either eyes or nose or mouth was correlated with 
any change in visual behaviour. By 16 weeks the photograph did elicit 
greater total fixation than the drawings. Data from the first fixation 
gave varying results. Over all, there did seem to be a "preference" for 
a more realistic representation of the face by 16 weeks, but there was no 
evidence that thejounger infants preferred a face-like pattern to a non-face- 
like pattern when both were of equal complexity, at least when represented 
schematically. These results are similar to those of Koopman and Ames (1967) 
who likewise found no significant differential fixation between a schematic 
face and a symmetrically scrambled contrôle stimulus. In general, 
complexity was considered to outweigh "faceness" as a determiner of 
preferences.
Unfortunately, in both the Wilcox and Clayton (1968) and the Wilcox (1969) 
scores of fixation were made directly during the experiment and without the 
aid of either slow motion video-tape or film. Though reliability between 
observers was high, the validity of such a method is always questionable 
and may account in part for lack of more significant results,
[cognition, methodology] Rovee and Rovee (1969) studies 18 infants, 
aged 9 to 12 weeks. All infants were supplied with a coloured mobile which 
they could fixate. An experimental group of 6 infants was supplied with an
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ankle cord so that leg movements could directly affect the movement of 
the mobile. Within the first six minutes of conjugate reinforcement of 
foot thrusts, operant response rate tripled for experiment
Rovee and Rovee considered their results to be "true learning as a 
direct result of the contingency between the thrust and the mobile movement", 
and not to reflect "merely a state of general arousal produced by the 
moving target". Moreover, they suggested that Piagel’s sensory-motor 
Stage III ("Procedures for Making Interesting Sights Last") might be 
effectively brought about in advance of 4 months by operant procedures.
Similar results were obtained by Caron (1967).
[fixation, pattern perception] Nelson and Kessen (1969) compared 
the visual responses of 36 infants, 6 days or under, to three separately 
presented stimulus patterns: "a complete outline triangle, only the sides
of this triangle, and only the angles or verices of this triangle". 
Experimental results re-affirmed the conclusion of Salapatek and Kessen
(1966) that "angular components of triangles are more powerful than linear 
side contours in attracting ocular orientation of new-born infants". 
Moreover, "infants typically looked only toward a single angular component" 
and did notscan the triangles. It will be remembered that Bower (1966) 
observed how two months old infants were able to complete a visually 
incomplete. It would therefore appear that by the end of the first month, 
infants no longer fix upon selected features but are able to scan and/or to 
register a stimulus as a whole, and that the non-angular parts of a 
structure such as sides per se have become more important.
[fixation, cognition, physiology] Wickelgren (1969) photographed the 
eyes of 36 neonates, aged 19.5 to 134 hours, in "response to intermittent 
visual movement created by sequentially illuminated lights". All infants 
"responded to the moving lights by shifting direction of gaze appropriately 
towards the left or right lights. Conjugate eye movements were observed 
with a frequency about 45 - 50%, but eyes were frequently non-convergant. 
Wickelgren’s 1969 findings are compatible with those of Nelson (1968) 
though scanning of a moving stimulus was found to be earlier.
[fixation, cognition, habituation] In a similar experiment, though with 
older infants, Cohen (1969) investigated the effects of complexity of a 
matrix of blinking lights on 90 infants aged 2 to 6 months. Longest 
fixations were initially given to stimuli of intermediate complexity (i.e., 
position change) and tended to decrease over trials. However, only one 
part of the experiments indicate that greater stimulus change was correlated 
with less habituation.
Cohen pointed out that a "reduction of fixation time over trials does not
necessarily indicate habituation". He considered his experiment to 
confirm the prediction that "an intermediate level of stimulus change will 
produce maximal visual exploration".
[motility, fixation, cognition! Still another experiment to use a 
matrix of blinking lights was published the same year as the previous two 
by Haith, Kessen and Collins (1969).Twelve 2 to 4 months old infants 
were presented with 3 levels of visual complexity. The stimuli were 
intermittent flashing lights which gave the effect of movement. Contrary 
to Kagan and Lewis (1965), limb movement and rate of sucking were suppressed 
by the most simple and by the most complex levels of stimulation but were 
facilitated by the intermediate level. There was no evidence for any 
systematic habituation. Of course, different experimental procedures may 
account for the differences between the two studies.
Berlyne's (1960) optimal-level hypothesis would predict the greatest 
suppression of activity to intermediate complexity or an inverted U-shaped 
curve, Haith, Kessen and Collins found exactly the opposite curvilinear 
function. Sucking was consistently suppressed by stimulation but unfortunately 
the degree of suppression did not appear to be discriminative of the various 
degrees of stimulus complexity which were under study.
1970
[physiology, pattern perception! Miranda (1970) compared 27 premature 
infants of less than 38 weeks conceptional age and 27 full-term neonates. 
Prematures were on the average post-natally older by 
21 days than were the full-term infants. Nonetheless, both premature 
and full-term infants showed a strong preference for patterned over plain 
• stimuli. .Though no reliable preferences for linear or round contours were 
evidenced, a schematic face was preferred to a photograph of a face 
lacking in sharp contrast. A higher proportion of subjects in each group 
tended to fixate longer a circle with 2 centrally-located dots than with 
similar dots together at the periphery. Obviously, premature infants can 
be considered to have a "functional system for receiving patterned stimulation".
Although few differences were to be found between the prematures and the 
full-term, this lack of results could have been indirectly due to the 
difference in post-partuitional ages.
Miranda was most explicit that "it is not necessary to assume equal 
visual and neural development for the two groups". He concluded that it was 
necessary only to assume "that both groups have sufficiently developed eye 
and brain to discriminate some rather gross differences between stimuli;
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and that both groups having the minimal sensory requirements, also have 
the tendency to select the same stimulus of the pairs".
[habituation, sex differences] Friedman, Nagy and Carpenter (1970) 
studied 20 male and 20 female neonates, aged 24 to 90 hours. Visual 
fixation was observed to decrease with successive presentation of each of 
two stimuli. Males showed more decrement in fixation time to the 
simpler stimulus; females, to the more complex. Because of the particular 
sex differences found in their study, Friedman, Nagy and Carpenter 
pointed out that their results were not consistent with the conclusions of 
Ames (1966), Caron and Caron (1969), Kagan and Lewis (1965), and Kagan,
Heakey, Hen-Tov, Levine and Lewis (1966), though "a differential process 
of information storage and processing may exist for the two sexes as 
reflected in overt visual behaviour".
[handling] Another study with neonates was conducted by Kgrner and 
Thomas (1970).Sixty-four 2 to 3 day old infants were given 6 "interventions" 
which consisted of contact, vestibular stimulation or upright positioning, 
singly or in various combinations with each other. Infants were then 
rated for alertness. No sex differences were found. Likewise, no differences 
were associated with mode of feeding (breast or bottle). In spite of 
considerable individual differences, Karner and Thomas concluded that "in 
the context of soothing the infant, vestibular stimulation had a highly 
significant effect on alerting". Contact per se'had little effect except 
when combined with vestibular stimulation and upright positioning. Karner 
and Thomas speculated that "vestibular stimulation which attends most 
caretaking activities may be more crucial than contact for certain aspects 
of early human development".
[depth perception] Bower (1970) conducted four experiments using a 
total of 39 infants ranging from 6 to 20 days of age. He observed that 
neonates show a visually controlled, distially appropriate avoidance response 
to approaching objects provided the object does not approach at a velocity 
greater than 25 centimetres a second. Bower emphasised that this 
discrimination was mediated neither by changes of air pressure nor by 
proximal cues.
[depth perception, cognition] Two further experiments on neonatal 
perception were conducted by Bower with the assistance of Broughton and 
Moore (1970). In the first experiment^ 5 infants, aged 6 to 11 days, were 
presented with a three-dimensional object in one of 5 positions: midline;
30 degrees right; 60 degrees right; 30 degrees left, and 60 degrees left. 
Seventy per cent of all attempts to grasp the object came within 5 degrees
(i.e., 1.5 centimetres) of the object and was therefore considered 
to be "oriented". In order to test the intentionality of visually-directed 
grasping behaviour, a second experiment was designed. Eleven infants, 
ranging from 8 to 31 days, were fitted with goggles and presented with a 
virtual object. It was assumed that if the infant intended to grasp an 
object then a virtual object would frustrate him; and to the contrary, if 
he did not, then he would experience no frustration. All infants cried 
15 to 75 seconds after their first reach towards the virtual object, whereas 
no infant cried when reaching and contacting the real object. Bower,
Broughton and Moore interpreted this as evidence for intentional grasping.
[cognition, habituation] Hunt (1970) distinguished between "perceptual 
satiation" (which occurs in response to continuous perceptual contact with 
a stimulus) and "habituation" (which occurs in response to repeated encounters 
with the same stimulus separated over considerable periods of time). 
"Perceptual satiation" would then explain how a preference for a non-familiar 
stimulus would take place before experience with a familiar stimulus had 
produced "the enduring central process codings within the central nervous 
system required for recognition at another time (long-term memory)". As a 
result of this distinction. Hunt postulated a stage of attentional 
preference for the familiar preceding attentional preference for what is 
unfamiliar or novel.
[cognition, habituation] Uzgiris and Hunt (1970) placed two mobiles over 
the cribs of 15 one month old infants for 4 to 5 weeks. Infants were then 
tested twice during the second month and again during the third. Twelve of 
the fifteen looked longer at the familiar pattern while none looked longer 
at the unfamiliar. In other words, repeated encounters with the 
experimentally familiarized stimuli lead to infants fixating those stimuli 
more frequently than novel stimuli.
As a second part of their experiment, Uzgiris and Hunt compared infants' 
fixation of one mobile which would move in response to their actions and of 
another which remained motionless. It \\ias hypotdiesized that infants W3uld fixate 
more frequently the responsive mobile. In contrast to Caron (1967) and to 
Rovee and Rovee (1969), Uzgiris and Hunt did not find a preference for 
the responsive mobile. However, the measure in question was visual 
fixation and not behaviour associated with making the mobile respond.
[cognition, habituation] Greenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt (1970) extended 
the previously-mentioned experiment. Twenty-four one month old infants 
were exposed regularly to a patterned stimulus. At the age of two months, 
infants were tested to compare their reactions to familiarized and non- 
familiarized stimuli. Most infants spent "longer than half the total
looking time" attending to the familiar stimulus. However, when tested 
again at 3 months, the same infants looked longer at the unfamiliar stimulus. 
Greenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt concluded that there is "strong evidence for 
the existence of a process, deriving from perceptual exposure to a pattern, 
with a phase of attentional preferences for familiar pattern developing 
before the appearance of attentional preferences for the unfamiliar or 
novel". Since only three days of familiarization were necessary to bring 
about a preference in ten naive or contrôle infants (aged 3 months) for novel 
stimuli, maturation was considered to be a likely explanation of the shift.
1971
[cognition, habituation, sex difference] Weizmann, Cohen and Pratt 
(1971) conducted an experiment in which thirty-two infants 4 weeks old, 
were exposed for a half hour daily to "one of two stabiles in one of two 
basinettes". At 6 weeks, infants looked significantly more at the familiar 
than at the novel stimuli. But by 8 weeks, the novel stimulus received 
more looking than the familiar, though the degree of difference was not 
significant. Most curious was a significant "sex x environmental novelty 
by (=new basinette) x stabile novelty" interaction which indicated that 
the 8 weeks old males in the study looked more at a novel stabile in a 
familiar environment, while females looked more at a novel stable in a 
novel environment. Weizmann, Cohen and Pratt pointed out that this finding 
is incompatible with McCall and Kagan’s (1967) tentative speculation that 
females may be more advanced than males.
[methodology, pattern perception] McKenzie and Day (1971) trained 
10 infants, aged 6 - 1 2  weeks, to turn their head to the left in the presence 
of a predetermined stimulus and demonstrated that head turning could be brought 
under visually discriminated control. The authors emphasized the ambiguity 
of drawing conclusions from measures of fixation: "An infant may be able
to perceive differences in stimuli without this difference necessarily 
being reflected in duration of fixation. Furthermore, any changes with 
age may indicate either a change of preference or of the attention-eliciting 
properties of the stimulus, rather than the infant's power of discrimination". 
They therefore concluded that an operant conditioning technique similar to 
the one used in their study could be used as a method (alternative to 
measure of fixation) for the study of perceptual discrimination during 
early infancy.
[methodology, pattern perception, sex differences] Greenberg and 
Weizmann (1971) tested 12 infants at 8 weeks and another 12 at 12 weeks to 
determine relative fixation times to 3 checkerboard patterns of various
degrees of complexity. All infants were tested with a single stimulus and 
with a paired-comparisons method of presentation. Both methods were found 
to yield results depicting similar age and sex differences. All older 
infants fixated longer the more complex patterns. Yet females fixated 
the more complex stimuli relatively longer than the males. Females appeared 
to focus more exclusively on "favored" stimuli and to ignore the rest of 
the environment whereas males tended to deploy "their attention more 
widely when an alternative stimulus was readily available". Though both 
experimental methods were considered to be comparable, Greenberg and Weizmann 
advocated that "the paired comparisons method was superior in distinguishing 
... blank looking from meaningful perceptual-cognitive interaction with a 
stimulus". Greenberg and Weizmann made no explicit reference to position 
effects though it appears that infants in their study did not attend 
equally between both sides.
[cognitive] Bower (1971) reviewed his research on infantile perception 
of objects. In addition to the findings of his 1970 papers (Bower,
1970 Broughton and Moore 1970), he reports the results of an experiment
on infants' reactions to the disappearance and re-appearance of an object. 
Infants were 3 weeks to 3 months of age. Using change of heart beat.
Bower concluded that infants manifested surprise when a moving object 
disappeared behind a screen but did not re-appear. The older the infant, 
the longer a delay it was capable of enduring and still show evidence of 
expecting an object to re-appear. Moreover, all infants anticipated the 
re-appearance of an object, i.e., they look to the spot where the object 
should re-appear. However, infants continued to track a moving object 
along its trajectory even after seeing the object stop. As a result of 
further experiments. Bower came to the conclusion that "three-month old 
infants do not recognize the identity of an object at a standstill and 
the same object in motion, and vice versa". For younger infants, 
movement was more important than features of an object, they did not 
seem perplexed when one object was substituted for another so long as the 
object kept moving in the same trajectory. In contrast, the older 
infants seemed "to have learned to define an object as something that can 
go from place to place along pathways of movement". That is, an object 
is identified by its features rather than by its movement. The transition . 
to a world of solid objects which have features and which can move in 
space was considered to take place sometime around or after 16 weeks. When 
an infart 19 weeks or less is presented with multiple images of his mother via an 
arrangement of mirrors, he coos, goos and responds to all the images.
The more the merrier, so to speak. But after 20 weeks, an infant becomes 
quite upset by the image of more than one mother.
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Summary of Literature
An infant's perceptual abilities are influenced by the presence or 
absence of medication during labour (Stecl^ler, 1964) and by subsequent 
handling (White and Castle, 1964; Kgrner and Thomas, 1970).
The fixation reflex is present in all normal full-term and many
premature infants (Kiff and Lepard, 1966). Most full-term neonates 
evidence conjugate eye movement as well (Brazelton, Scholl and Robey, 1966), 
though eyes do not always converge (Wickelgren, 1969). Moreover, some 
neonates possess a visual acuity of at least 20/150 (Dayton et al, 1964). 
However, focal length is fixed for the first month or so at an average of 
19 cm. (Haynes, White and Held 1964). Probably, the neonate is able to 
perceive clearly only strong contrasts of greys (Nelson 1968), Unable to 
scan a stationary pattern, he fixates only one part of it, such as a corner 
or angle (Salapatek and Kessen, 1966; Nelson and Kessen, 1969), though 
he is able to track a moving stimulus(e.g. Wickelgren, 1969; Bower, 1971).
By 4 months his visual system seems roughly equivalent in most.respects 
to an adults' (Haynes, White and Held, 1965; Bower, 1966).. . -
Infants are definitely capable of distinguishing colours (Valentine,
1913; Staples, 1932), though form and shape appear to dominate colour in 
attracting visual attention (e.g. Fantz, 1961, 1963; Spears, 1964). Pattern
or contour have been described as intrinsically interesting (Fagtz, 1958,
1961, 1963, 1966; Berlyne, 1958). Moreover, infants will clearly "work" 
for visual clarity (Bruner, 1968). Though the mere presence of patterned 
stimulation has been found sufficient to elicit attention (Steepler, 1966; 
Moffett, 1969) infants tend to prefer stimuli which change or move in 
response to their own actions (Caron, 1967; Rovee and Rovee, 1969).
From the first days onward, figure is perceived against ground; objects 
are isolated and perceived in depth (Bower 1964, 1966, 1970, 1971;
Bower, Broughton and Moore, 1970j Fantz, 1966),
Moreover, complexity of a stimulus has proved an important 
variable. Though the results of experiments on infantile reactions to 
stimuli of varying degrees of complexity are dependent upon an actual 
stimulus condition and upon specific experimental procedures, it appears 
that relatively more complex stimuli elicit greater amounts of, and more 
frequent fixation than, simpler or homogeneous stimuli. However, there 
appears to be an optimal range of complexity which varies according to age.
A stimulus can be too simple or too complex, an optimal stimulus lying 
somewhere between the extremes of complexity and simplicity. The older an 
infant, the more likely he is to fixate preferentially a more complex 
stimulus, (Herschenson, Munsinger and Kessen, 1965; Thomas, 1965; Brennen,
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Ames and Moore, 1966; Caron and Caron, 1969; Moffett, 1969; Cohen, 1969;
Haith, Kessen and Collins, 1969)
Some experimenters (Saayman , Ames and Moffett, 1964; Friedman, Nagy 
and Carpenter, 1970; Fantz, 1966) claim that infants "habituate" to 
successive presentations of a stimulus, though the results of a few 
studies (Kagan and Lewis, 1965; Haith, 1966; McCall and Kagan 1967; Meyers and 
Cantor 1967) give results to the contrary. It appears that results may 
depend not only on the behaviour used to indicate perception but also on 
the nature of the experimental design. Nonetheless, visual fixation tends 
frequently to decrease with repated presentations of a stimulus. Hunt (1970) 
points out, however, that there is no justification for equating response 
decrement and habituation when stimulus presentations come in close succession 
or when they last for a considerable length of time. According to Hunt
(1970), and to Cohen (1969), decrement in fixation of one stimulus over one 
interval or over several successive intervals is an indication of "perceptual 
satiation" and habituation, to the contrary, presupposes the "internalization" 
or commitment to long-term memory of a stimulus which can then be compared
with itself at a later point in time. When the distinction between
perceptual satiation and habituation is made, there is evidence that a 
stage of perceptual preference for the familiar precedes a preference for the 
novel (Uzgiris and Hunt, 1970; Greenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt, 1970). The 
degree to which such a sequence of preferences is maturational, exponential 
or a combination of the two is still open to question. Different experiments 
point to contradictory conclusions (Greenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt, 1970;
Weizmann, Cohen and Pratt 1971).
Most interesting has been evidence for possible sex differences. In 
some experiments, female infants have been found to be more capable of 
sustained attention than males or to "prefer" more complex stimuli (Kagan 
and Lewis, 1965; McCall and Kagan, 1967; Meyers and Cantor, 1967; Caron
and Caron, 1969; Friedman, Nagy and Carpenter, 1970; Greenberg and
Weizman, 1971). Kagan and associates frequently interpret this finding to 
indicate visual precocity in the female; other authors are more hesitant 
about such an interpretation. However, some experimenters have found no 
sex difference or, to the contrary, evidence that males remain more 
responsive than females, (Haith, 1966; Caron, 1968; Weizmann, Cohen and 
Pratt, 1971).
It has been suggested that the facial gestalt is "preferred" to (i.e. 
more frequently fixated than) other patterns (Fantz, 1966). Not all
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experiments support this hypothesis, however. In one experiment (Kagan 
et al, 1966), four months old infants showed no differences in cumulative 
fixation for masks of a natural face, a face with scrambled features or 
even without features. Yet smiling and large decreases in heart rate were 
significantly more frequent to a natural face pattern. Likewise, other 
experiments (Koopman and Ames, 1967; Wilcox, 1969) found no preferential 
fixation of face-like stimuli when alternative non-face-like stimuli were 
of equal complexity. In short, complexity seemed to outweigh "faceness" 
as a determiner of fixation. Nonetheless, a photographed face was fixated 
increasingly longer at four months, which in fact suggests that a more 
realistic respresentation of the face is "preferred" by the beginning of 
the second quarter.
The orientation of the face may also be an important variable (Watson, j
1966). The presence of the eyes has been stressed by several experimenters 
(Spitz, 1946, 1948, 1965; Ahrens, 1954; Kagan, Henker, Hen-Tov, Levine 
and Lewis, 1966). Facial expression, however, seems to be of little 
importance during the first months (Wilcox and Clayton, 1968). _____ ____
Methodological problems seem to plague infantile perception research as 
virulently as they do comparable adult studies. Above all, the age of individual 
infants and the range of ages in a sample can provide significant sources of 
variation. A week old infant is perceptually very different from a year old. 
Other problems are equally formidable. Firstly, the actual stimuli used 
appear to determine in part the type of responses an infant emits. What 
might be an intermediately complex stimulus in one study can be equilivant 
to the simplest or to the most complex in another. Secondly, the method of 
stimulus presentation is important. The two methods most frequently used 
are the single stimulus and the paired stimuli methods. Some authors claim 
these two methods give the same results (Creenberg and Weizmanr^ 1971), though 
others have claimed that the paired stimulus method is unpracticle for infants 
under 6 months (Ames and Silfen, 1965). Thirdly, the problem of behavioural 
measures for discrimination and their meaning has not been solved as of the 
present. Some authors use first fixation, longest fixation or cumulative 
fixation (Berlyne, 1958, Fantz, 1966, Cohen, 1969). Others use habituation 
or "perceptual satiation" (Caron and Caron, 1968, 1969; Friedman, Nagy and 
Carpenter, 1970; Uzgiris and Hunt, 1970; Creenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt, 1970)
S till others use responses such as heart rate, crying, smiling, bodily activity
or any combination of these (Lew/s, Kagan and Kalafat 1966; McCall and Kagan,
1967) a few utilized operant techniques (Bower, 1966; Caron, 1964)
Considering the varieties of experimental possibilities it is surprising 








there is evidence that infants four months or younger can distinguish 
a three dimensional object from a two dimensional (Bower 1970), that 
complexity of a stimulus is an important variable(Moffett, 1969) and 
that a more natural and/or more complete facial pattern seems to be 
preferred to other approximations of it (Wilcox, 1969)., it would 
therefore be reasonable to question an assumption implicit in the 
conclusions drawn from several previous experiments. This assumption 
is that an infant would react similarly to a real, living human face 
as he has been shown to react to various approximations to it. The 
question is: From the infant's point of view, are masks, schematic
drawings, photographs and plaster casts the same as an actual face?
Obviously, the human face is a very rich and extremely complex 
stimulus-Gestalt, but unlike most other equally complex Gestalten, 
it has specific social implications. Therefore, the following 
experiment was designed as a pilot study to investigate which parts 
of a living human face must be perceptually present if it is to be 
recognised by an infant.
PILOT STUDY
Visual recognition and discrimination in the human infant are 
inferable from a variety of behaviours in response to visual stimuli:
(a) differential fixation (Berlyne, 1958; Fantz, 1966, Cohen,1969),
(b) differential rates of habitation and of spontaneous recovery from 
habituation(Caron and Caron, 1968, 1969; Friedman, Nagy and 
Carpenter, 1970),
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(c) differential changes in heart rate (Lewis, Kagan and Kalafat,1966; 
McCall and Kagan, 1967; Meyers and Cantor, 1967),
(d) differential changes in respiration (Lewis, Kagan and Kalafat,1966),
(e) differential changes in skin potential (Steepler, Bradford and 
Levey, 1966),
(f) differential changes in gross bodily activity or motility(Lewis, 
Kagan and Kalafat, 1966; Stec&^er, Bradford and Levy, 1966),
(g) differential smiling (Ahrens, 1954; Watson, 1966)»
(h) differential vocalization and/or crying (Lewis, Kagan and 
Kalafat, 1966)^
(i) differential supression of sucking(Haith, 1966),
(j) differential emission of operant responses(Bower, 1966;Caron,1967).
In the present study, fixation was chosen as the prime behavioural 
measure (1) because nothing is done to or attached to an infant (and 
thus neither mother nor infant is threatened), (2) because it involves 
no training of either infant or mother (and thus does not interfere in 
their relationship or routines), (3) because it is the least consuming of 
a mother's and of an infant's time and goodwill, and (4) because it is 
relatively uncomplicated and inexpensive. Therefore, a modified Fantz 
technique was employed with the basic assumption that differential 
fixation presupposes visual discrimination. Fixation, however, has been 
criticized as a behavioural index of "preference" (Kagan, Henker,Hen-Tov, 
Levine and Lewis, 1966). Consequently, it was decided to note the 
occurrence of alternative behavioural indices of "preference" and of its 
converse, "aversion", such as smiling, vocalisation, crying or the like. 
Subjects and Apparatus
- Twelve white.infants from working and middle class London ..
families were seen within an hour after the morning or afternoon feed. 
Mean age was fourteen weeks. Each infant was placed in a "safe-sitter" 
within a "looking box", designed in the form of a truncated pyramid, open 
on top. In one wall was constructed a window, covered by a shutter which 
could be opened to expose the stimulus.
Stimulus Conditions
For each infant, the stimulus was his own mother's face, under the 
following 6 conditions:
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1. full face, i.e. a normal or complete face,
2. face without eyes, i.e. face with both eyes blocked by a strip
of plastic inserted between the infant and the mother’s eyes,
3. eyes only peering through an open band in the plastic which 
masked the rest of the face,
4. face without hair and forehead; i.e. face from eyebrows down, hair 
and forehead blocked by plastic,
5. face without nose and mouth; i.e. face without mouth and lower
part of nose blocked by a plastic strip,
6. artificial outline, i.e. face peering through a circular hole
in a plastic strip which concealed the natural outline.
Conditions were presented in a prearranged order, different for each
infant. The presentation of each condition lasted 20 seconds, followed
by an equal interval intended as a recovery period.
RESULTS
Four measures were used: (1) cumulative fixation, {V) response 
latency, (3) looking away (4) smiling.
Cumulative fixation; Ocular orientations to the stimulus were monitored
by a concealed close circuit television system. The physical construction 
of the apparatus did not permit recording of the corneal reflection. 
Measurements of cumulative fixation as determined by orientations were 
taken from a video-tape record. These results, divided into two sub­
groups according to age(i.e. younger and older), and arranged in order 
of magnitude of response are depicted in Table I; the analysis of 
variance is summarised . in Table II. There was no significant change 
with age either generally or for any particular conditions. Nonetheless, 
the mean cumulative fixation for all conditions within the younger group 
«i*e smaller than all for the older. The exact probability that this 
would occur is 1/64 and thus significant as to direction, though not as
to degree of.difference. Only differences-between conditions were 
significant (p <.001). Therefore Duncan’s Multiple Range Test was 
carried out on the mean cumulative fixation per condition for all 12 
subjects: "Face without eyes"w% different from all other conditions
(p < .001). "Eyes only" were significantly different from "artificial 
outline" (p < .05), but not from any other conditions except "face 
without eyes". There was no statistical difference to be found among
the other conditions: face "without hair and forehead", "without
nose and mouth","full face" or "artificial outline"^
Since "face without eyes" was fixated much less frequently than the 
remaining conditions and since total fixation of "face with eyes" but 
without either "hair and forehead" or "nose and mouth" did not differ 
significantly from that to "full face", it appears reasonable to 
conclude that the presence of the eyes ig requisite if an infant is to 
look at a face.
Response to the "artificial outline" remains uninterpretable due to 
the ambiguous nature of the shield covering the natural outline. On the 
one hand, it might be argued that the natural outline was removed; on 
the other, it might be argued equally well that the circular opening 
created a "super-outline", or more likely, made the remaining feature 
"super-stimuli". Yet, a "full face" which contained a natural outline 
was not fixated significantly less than "eyes only", a condition without 
outline.
To determine whether order of presentation might have contributed 
to the results obtained above, a rough estimate was made: the mean
cumulative fixation per ordinal position was calculated regardless of 
condition. No systematic differences were found. Five of the twelve 
infants were retested immediately upon completion of the first testing, 
the differences between the two mean cumulative fixations and standard 
deviations were calculated per condition. These are presented in 
Table III. No systematic pattern emerged across subjects.
Response latency: The time intervals between presentation of:.the
mother’s face and fixation of it was measured for eight infants. To
compensate for primitive methods of transcription and for inevitable
human error, all scores were rounded up to the nearest second. Therefore,
a score of one second was assigned to any response of a second or under,
no matter how small. When analysed by condition, Friedman’s Two-Way
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Analysis of Variance yielded x = 4.5357, which has a probability - 
p > .50. This finding suggests that an infant does not recognise which 
version of his mother’s face is being presented unless he looks at it 
directly. (The random ordering of conditions precluded anticipation of 
the next condition to be presented.) Response latency varied little 
according to serial position. The mean latency per position, regardless 
of condition, was 1.75 secs, except the second serial position, where it
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was 3 secs.
Looking-away; The opening of the shutter to expose the mother's face 
made a click and therefore served as a discriminative stimulus. As 
soon as the click was heard, all infants orientated to the open window 
through which the face was exposed. However, when "face without eyes" 
was presented, an infant usually looked away and did not glance back.
It seemed that infants were not just gazing randomly around the
"looking box" but were refusing to look at the stimulus. In contrast, 
infants looked away from other conditions only when the shutter closed.
Since the possible importance of "looking away" behaviour emerged but 
half way through the pilot study, records of only six infants were available 
for analysis. All of these infants looked away every time in response 
to the disappearance of the stimulus, whatever it might be, except 
"face without eyes".
If one makes the assumption that an infant is equally likely to look 
away or not to look away, the probability of the obtained rate of looking 
away is very low (p < .0002). All six infants looked away from "face 
without eyes" before the shutter closed. Three, however, glanced back 
as the closing shutter made a click, and then looked away. When the
remaining three infants who refused to orient to the closing shutter are
considered alone, the probability of obtaining the response of already 
looking away and not looking back for "face without eyes" only is 1/63.
Smiling; Six of the twelve infants smiled spontaneously during tests
at least once, each time in response to the stimuli, and not otherwise.
In order to determine whether or not smiling was dependent upon the
particular, stimulus condition, Cochran's Q test was employed and a
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significant difference between conditions was obtained (x = 11.7, 
p < .05). Jonckheere's trend test against ordered alternatives yielded 
a significant positive relationship between amount of smiling and of 
looking (z = 2.196, p < .014). The relationship between smiling and 
looking is graphed in Figure I.
No infant smiled to "face without eyes". Fisher's Exact Probability 
test was used to determine whether the presence or absence of the eyes 
was crucial for smiling. The result was significant (p < .001). Spitz 
(1946, 1948) and Ahrens (1954) stress the importance of the forehead and 
nose, as well as the eyes; but the present experiment suggests that 
absence of either forehead or nose is not correlated with a systematic 
decrease in smiling, nor their presence with an increase.
Other responses: Only a few infants vocalised and then not 
consistently. At times vocalisation occurred in response to mother, 
irrespective of condition with the exception of "face without eyes".
At other times, vocalizations occurred continuously, even in the 
interval or rest period. Since crying and looking are incompatible 
responses at four months or under, infants who cried were excluded from 
this analysis. Thus, crying never occurred in the twelve infants whose 
records were used for this paper. They protested at neither the 
appearance, the disappearance, nor the condition of the stimulus. Some 
of the few infants who did fuss (and whose records were therefore 
excluded) stopped crying in response to the presentation of the face 
under all conditions except "face without eyes".
Discussion of Pilot Study
Infants spent more time looking at a living face which contained eyes 
than at one without them. In fact, infants actively refused to look at 
a face without eyes. By contrast, the presence of the eyes only was 
sufficient to elicit looking. Nonetheless, eyes plus some other part 
of the face, be it either "hair and forehead" or "nose and mouth", 
received more looking than "eyes only". However, there is no evidence 
that a complete face was looked at any more frequently than a partial 
face which contained eyes.
An Impromptu Naturalistic Experiment
A 16 week old infant who participated in the pilot study was in 
the laboratory sitting on his mother's lap. Both mother and infant 
were watching a television monitor on which a test tape was being played. 
The author noted that as long as a human face was on, the infant watched 
attentively. When a geometric test pattern came on, however, the infant 
looked away. Therefore, the following impromptu experimefit was 
conducted :
The infant was allowed to fixate the monitor on which was presented 
either a human face or a complex test pattern. The experimenter could 
manipulate at will which pattern would be presented. When the face 
was presented, the infant watched attentively. When the experimenter 
switched to the non-facelike pattern, however, the infant looked away.
Whenever the infant glanced back,he would look away if the pattern was on. 
But if the face had been presented while he was looking away, then he 
would fixate the monitor so long as the face was on.
These incidental findings suggested that an infant of 16 weeks could 
"watch" television. Therefore, it was hoped that television would permit a
more refined method of stirauls presentation than used in the pilot 
study. First of all, televiçed stimuli can be standardized. Secondly, 
films of relatively motionless faces nevertheless preserve minimal 
movement and small variations in light intensity which render a filmed 
face more complex as a stimulus than a mere photograph of it. Moreover, 
television permits the same face to be presented simultaneously at two 




From the pilot study, the following three hypotheses were obtained:
1. "Face without both eyes" would receive less fixation than would 
any other condition.
2. "Full face", "face without nose and mouth" or "without hair and 
forehead" would not be differentiable from each other in terms of 
amounts of fixation received by each.
3. "Eyes only" would be less frequently fixated than "full face", "face 
■ without nose and mouth" or "without hair and forehead".
The condition "artificial outline" was replaced with a "face without 
outline" (see below), and a new condition was added: "face without one eye". 
Therefore two further hypotheses were formulated with respect to the 
literature.
4. The "face without one eye" would be fixated less than all the other 
conditions except perhaps "face without both eyes" (Spitz, 1946,1948).
5. "Face without outline" would be fixated less than remaining 
conditions, except perhaps "eyes only", but more than "face without 
one eye" and "without both eyes".
An additional three hypotheses not involving fixation time pef se were 
formulated. The first of these was drawn directly from the pilot study:
6. A negative reaction would occur more frequently to "face without 
both eyes" than to any other condition.*
7. The results obtained from measures of fixation for both the pilot and 
main studies, when arranged in either ascending or descending 
magnitude, would yield approximately the same ordering of conditions.
A correlate of hypotheses No,7 was that:
8. The paired comparisons method would yield the same basic results as 
the single stimulus method (c.f., Greenberg and Weizmann, 1971); i.e. 
the results of the pilot study would be comparable with those of the 
main study and neither would be an artifact of experimental 
procedures.
In addition, individual differences and sex differences were to be 
"looked for", though specific hypotheses were not formulated.
* Looking away, however, could not be a measure in the main study since 
its experimental design made it impossible to distinguish "looking away" 
from "looking at something else".
No hypotheses were formulated concerning reaction time or latency 
to first fixation since these measures could not be used in the main 
study. There was no rest interval or recovery period between 
presentations, nor was there any discriminative stimulus to signal a 
new condition.
Subjects
Subjects were 28 white infants, aged 8 to 25 weeks, from working 
class, middle class and professional home backgrounds. Mothers were 
contacted at a local day clinic. A welfare visitor and/or member of 
staff made the initial approach to each mother to whom was explained 
the purpose and nature of the experiment. Interested mothers were then 
introduced to the experimenter who discussed the project with them, 
explained practical procedures and if the mother still seemed interested, 
invited her to participate. If the mother accepted, an appointment was 
made at her convenience. The experimenter did suggest that an hour after 
a morning, midday or afternoon feed, when the infant would be alert but 
not active, would perhaps be the best time. All mothers agreed.^
Stimuli
Black and white filmed episodes were taken of a relatively motionless 
female face made up for seven different degrees of completeness.
Features were masked with the aid of prosthetic pieces and cosmetics 
applied by a professional make-up artist. The seven different degrees of 
facial completeness (i.e., stimulus conditions) are listed below:
I. "face without both eyes", i.e. iTyi nr? eye^ camouflaged by 
flesh coloured putty,
II. "face without one eye", i.e. only one eye camouflaged by 
flesh coloured putty,
III. "eyes only" peering through a flesh coloured sheet of plastic 
fitted to give the effect that the eyes were peering through a 
veil which grar onto the face»
IV. "face without outline", i.e. forehead, nose and mouth peering 
through a veil similar to the one described in No.Ill,
V. "face without hair and forehead", i.e. the hair and forehead
blocked by a piece of board ,
VI. "face without nose and mouth", i.e. the nose and mouth covered
by a simian like mask, which gave the impression of a bandits
mask made of flesh,
VII. the "full", natural, complete or normal face.
Photographs of the seven stimuls conditions are presented in Plates I-VII.
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Each presentation of a condition lasted exactly twenty seconds.
A two second interval came between presentations. Each stimulus 
condition was paired with each other, except for "face with one eye" 
which was paired only with three other conditions. Two sets of random 
ordered pairs were made up so that no condition would follow itself^ 
nor Would appear on either a previous or subsequent episode of the 
sequence with which it was paired. The paired sequences were 
alternated to correct for any possible positional difference; i.e. 
sequence X might be presented on the right and Y on the left or vice 
versa. The sequences are listed below * :
Sequence I Sequence II
X Y X Y
1. F-0 E only 1. FF F-H
2. F-NM F-H 2. E only F-2E
3. FF E only 3. F-IE F-0
4. F-2E F-0 4. F-NM FF
5. E only F-IE 5. F-0 F-H
6. F-NM FF 6. F-2E F-IE
7. E only F-2E 7. F-NM F-0
8. F-H F-0 8. FF E only
9. F-IE FF 9. F-0 F-2E
10. F-2E F-H 10. E only F-NM
11. F-0 F-NM 11. F-IE FF
12. F-IE F-2E 12. F-2E E only
13. FF F-H 13. F-2E F-NM
14. F-NM F-2E 14. F-H E only
15. F-IE F-0 15. FF F-2E
16. E only F-NM 16. F-H F-NM
17. F-2E FF 17. F-0 FF
18. F-H E only 18. F-2E F-H
19. F-0 FF 19. E only F-IE
Apparatus »
Stimuli were presented on two television monitor^ one beside the 
otherj in between was located a television camera with close-up lens, 
which recorded all of an infant's eye movements. Monitors and camera 
were mounted in such a way as to obtain a standard distance of no less 
than 10 and no more than 12 inches between the infant's eyes and the 
viewing screen or lens. The viewing chamber in which the infant was 
placed was covered on three sides and on top (except for three openings 
for the two monitors and camera) by translucent plexiglass which 
transmitted light but no pattern. Photographs of the apparatus and 
recording devices are presented in Plates VIII, IX and X,
*F-2E = face without both eyes, F-IE = face without one eye, E only = 
eyes only, F-0 = face without outline, F-NM = face without nose and 
mouth, F-H = face without hair and forehead, FF = full face.
** Nine-inch monitors were used; the stimuli (i.e., faces) were five inches 
from tip of chin to top of forehead.
052
Testing Procedures and Data Collection
At a pre-arranged time, the author called at the family home to 
collect mother and infant. They were then taken to the laboratory 
where the author explained the apparatus and testing procedure and 
answered any further questions. Once he was convinced that the mother 
was comfortable, he suggested that the experiment could begin whenever 
she felt her infant would be most cooperative. The infant was then 
placed by his mother in a crib made of transparent plastic. A head rest 
gave the infant's head support and restricted movement without prohibiting 
it. The crib with infant in it was then wheeled into position in the
looking chamber (i.e. under the monitors), the camera was focused on one
eye and the recording device activated. Stimuli tapes were synchronized
and started. The whole testing lasted 7 minutes. If an infant cried or
fussed, his mother was invited to interrupt at any movement. If an 
infant continued to protest, the testing was terminated by the suggestion 
of the experimenter, with mother's consent of course. Each mother was 
allowed to view the video taped results as they were being made. After 
the experiment was over, any further questions were answered. If a 
second testing was considered advantageous, the experimenter raised the 
possibility and if the mother was interested, a further appointment was 
set up. In any case, each mother was given 50 new pence (10 shillings) 
for her infant, no matter what had happened, whether he cried, fell 
asleep, only watched his hands, or attended to the test stimuli. Then 
mother and infant were returned home.
A mother was allowed to bring her husband, her own mother, a friend, 
or an older pre-school sibling. A corner of the experimental room was 
furnished with small chairs and toys for children and ordinary chairs for 
the mother and any guest she wished to invite.
Data transcription
All records of eye movements were initially surveyed to determine 
whether or not they met predetermined criteria. These criteria were :
(a) an infant had to give evidence of visual discrimination;
(b) an infant had to remain attentive for at least 14 of the 19 
paired presentations.
Once it was decided to transcribe a record for a given infant, then 
that record was included in the statistical analyses no matter what the 
results turned out to be. Only one record, the first complete, was 
used from each infant no matter how many records were taken. The most 
any infant was tested was 4 times. The majority of infants were seen 
twice.
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The video tape record of eye movements was played back 3 times 
slower than the original speed. An infant was considered to be 
fixating only when:
(c) the eye was not dilated; i.e. the degree of pupilary opening 
appeared to be adaptive to light intensity emitted by the stimuli,
(d) frequent small refixations and the jerky part of the nystagmus 
were present,
(e) the reflection of the target was approximately 2/3 or more 
coincident with the pupilary opening.
By contrast, blank stares were characterized by stationary or fixed 
eyes, sometimes with dilation. Neither random eye movements nor blank 
stares were counted as fixations, even if the image was completely 
coincident with the pupil.*
The acceptance of criteria a - e is based on the finding by 
researches into the physiology of infantile vision that by three to 
four months an infant's visual system approximates an adult's in terms 
of function (Haynes, White and Held, 1964).
A Venner timer and an events recorder were both wired so that they 
could be activated simultaneously by the depression of a small key. When 
the two records thus obtained were combined, the number of fixations 
and length of each as well as of total fixation were obtainable.
It was found necessary to observe all eye movements before accurate 
measures could be taken. Because the scoring of eye movements and of 
the coincidence of reflected image and pupil represents such complex 
judgements, a transcriber must be able to anticipate how the eyes are 
going to move (even when 3 times slower than normal) in order to obtain 
two measures which, when divided by 3, would give the same result. It 
is impossible to make a blind transcription of eye movement patterns, 
especially at full or natural speed; slow motion is requisite.
Tapes were analysed according to the number of the conditions, with 
fixation times assigned to "right" and "left". There was no knowledge 
of the stimulus conditions beforehand. Though, in several of the cases, 
the stimulus condition was so clearly reflected in the baby's eyes that 
a transcriber could not remain ignorant of the conditions for which 
he was measuring fixation eye movements. If the first two transcriptions 
yielded the same result, then that measure was assumed to be accurate.
If, however, there was a discrepancy, then further measurements would be 
taken until 3 successive measures yielded the same result. Each record
* A diagram of an eye which meets criteria (c) and (e) is presented in 
plate XI and a photograph of an infant's eyes in which the monitors 
are reflected is presented in plate XII.
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was analysed by the author a second time, at least a month after the 
first transcription had been made. Pearon's Product—Moment Correlation 
test was then applied to the two transcriptions of the same record: 
r varied from ,93 to .99 with the average coefficient for the fourteen 
subjects .97 (p<.01).* One record was chosen at random and then
analysed simultaneously by the author and by a colleague who was already 
familiar with transcription of eye movements and who had been trained by 
the author to apply his criteria. Agreement between the two raters was 
extremely high: r = .98, p<.01. Although many publications contain no 
mention of .reliability, high correlations are not infrequent in those 
that do. Cantor and Meyers (1965) report a correlation coefficient of 
.93; Wickelgren- (1967) , .94 to .96; Nelson (1968), .97; Cohen (1969),
.93; Wickelgren ^1969), .92 to .96. Salapatek and Kessen (1969) do not 
give exact coefficients but do state that they were all greater than .90. 
Fixation is by and large an all-or-none phenomenon. An infant is either 
looking or not looking, except when the eye is moving toward or away from 
a given object of fixation. Moreover, the criteria for fixation can be 
designated in physiological and/or behavioural terms which are open to 
direct measurement. Thus one would expect high coefficents of 
correlation, especially when data have been recorded by a means which can 
be repeated any number of times and which can also be repeated at slow 
motion or even one frame at a time.
Results
Of the 28 infants tested, 8 were seen at 12 weeks or less, **
None of these infants showed differential fixation except perhaps one whose 
record was patchy and incomplete. Seven of the 8 oriented fixedly to one 
monitor whether or not there was any patterned stimulus present. In short, 
they appeared to show no differential reaction to â patterned or to a 
homogenous field as presented by the telvision monitor. An test was 
applied and this result was found to be significant (P< .003). It was 
therefore concluded that infants younger than 12 weeks had been unable to 
differentiate patterned from homogenous stimulus fields, as presented in 
the main study.
This result is the opposite of numerous other findings for infants of 
the same age and perhaps is attributable to the ethey particular method
* A subject's record consisted of 19 scores, each of which could be 
any number from zero to twenty, i.e. the fixation score for any condition.
** Of these eight, five were seen,at 16 weeks plus.
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of stimulus presentation used.
Of the 18 infants who were seen at age 16 weeks or older, 14 
gave at least one record which was considered suitable for analysis.
Of these 14, only four attended to both monitors most of the time.
Eight attended to both between one third to one half the time, though 
showed a decided position preference. The remaining two did not look 
except at one monitor, though their fixations were considered to be 
differential. Of the 4 infants who were able to attend to both monitors 
only two did not show a marked position preference.
Since a general position preference had been noted across infants 
before the data had been transcribed, it was decided to test for possible 
significance. A sum total was prepared for all stimulus conditions 
presented on the right and on the left. Then the larger was compared 
with the smaller across subjects. Student's t-test yielded a highly 
significant result (t = 5.7315, p< .000035).
The high degree of significance for this result came as a surprise 
since position preferences have been mentioned only occasionally in the 
published literature. In light of these results, it was considered 
advisable to analyse only the preferred side; in other words, the data 
were to be treated as if they had been obtained in a single stimulus 
situation. Therefore, the eighth hypothesis had to be excluded.
Seven infants preferred the left side; five, the right. Two infants 
showed virtually no preference for either side. Of the seven infants 
who orientated to the left side, four were male and three, female. Of 
the five who orientated to the right, two were male ; three, female.
There was no significant general preference for a given side, nor was 
there any association between sex and side preference.
Some infants seemed to"prefer" the monitor to which they were
orientating when the stimuli were first presented. A few infants changed 
sides early on and usually with the first presentation of "face without 
both eyes". It was as though they refused to look back at the side on 
which they discovered an eyeless face. Other infants glanced back and
forth between monitors but seemed to have a favourite for some unknoxvn
reason.
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The measures applied to the data obtained from the 14 infants 
(aged 16 - 25 weeks) were:
1. Average length of first fixation per condition^
2. Average length of longest fixation per condition,
3. The length of the one longest fixation per condition,
(referred to as "absolute longest" fixation),
4. Average cumulative fixation per condition,
5. The number of fixations per condition converted to a 
ratio (to be discussed below).
The first four measures, i.e. first, average longest, absolute 
longest and average cumulative fixation time, are graphed in Figure II, 
The analyses of variance for these 4 measures are summarised in Tables 
IV A - D. There was no significant differences between the sexes, 
though individual differences proved significant in all cases. Most 
importantly, differences between conditions were significant. Therefore, 
the following planned comparisons were made to test the hypotheses 
stated above:
(a) "face without both eyes" against all other conditions, i.e. 
against "face without one eye", "eyes only", "face without outline", 
"without hair and forehead", "x*jithout nose and mouth", and "full 
face".
(b) "face without one eye" against the remaining five conditions, 
i.e., against "eyes only", "face without outline", "without hair 
and forehead", "without nose and mouth", and "full face".
(c) "eyes only" against "face without outline".
(d) both "eyes only" and "face without outline" against the 
remaining three conditions, i.e., against "face without hair and 
forehead", "without nose and mouth", and "full face".
(e) "face without hair and forehead" against the remaining two 
conditions, i.e., against "face without nose and mouth" and 
"full face".
(f) "face without nose and mouth" against the last remaining 
condition, "full face".
The results of the planned comparisons are presented in Table V.
Even though the four measures are not independent, a statistic 
for correlation was employed for the first and the average longest 
fixations *.The result was extremely high (r=+.98). As the first 
fixation was sometimes the longest, these two measures are obviously 
not independent. Nonetheless, such a high correlation is good indication 
that both measures of fixation are measuring approximately the "same" 
phenomenon. Contrary to the findings of some other authors (Lewis,
Kagan and Kalafat, 1966), the pattern of looking gave no further 
information than did total fixation.
* Absolute longest fixation was considered to be only a variate of 
average longest, even though there was a slight difference between the 
results yielded by the two. Since measures of average first and of average
longest fixation are contained'ih-that of average cumulative,these latter 
three ware not compared. ' ' ' " ......
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The first fixation was the longest for 34^% of all presentations 
and the only one for 24%. Thus, if only the first fixation were taken 
as measure, the samp 1ing would have contained 58^% of the longest and 
of only fixations. However, there are definite individual differences.
As low as 23% and as high as 47% of first fixations per condition 
were longest. Similarly, as low as 6% and as high as 50% were the only 
fixation. Thus, the first fixation was the longest or only as low as 
37% of the time and as high as 86%. As can be seen in Table VI, 
there were no sex differences associated with the likelihood of the 
first response being the longest or only.
On the average, 30% of all presentations received a fixation
of 10 secs, or over, though one infant never gave a response as long
as 10 secs. For the two most responsive infants,53% of all presentations 
received fixations of 10 secs, or longer. If the occurence of these 
responses is considered in terms of number of responses given by an 
infant, instead of in terms of number of presentations, then the average 
was 12% with the lowest 0% and the highest 29%. These percentages
are contained in Table VII.
Of the respnses 10 secs, or over, a small number were for 
20 secs, or the total length of the presentation. The average number
of all presentations to receive one fixation for their total duration
was 7%. When considered in terms of responses, 3% of all fixations 
were 20 secs, in duration. As can be seen in Table VII, some infants
gave no responses of 20 secs., whereas the most responsive infant
fixated 29% of all presentations with one continuous fixation, this 
amounting to 16% of his responses.
A rate of looking was calculated from the number of fixations 
given in relation to the total fixation time. As the number of 
fixations increased, the length of individual fixations would have 
to decrease. However, since a given total fixation time might be the 
product of different numbers of fixations and since a given number 
of fixations might produce different totals, a ratio was considered 
preferable to the raw number of fixations. This ratio then represents 
how a given infant would have looked if he had continued to look 
all of the time possible and at the same rate as that part of the 
total time possible which he did actually fixate.
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The formula is: r = ^  where: r = ratio
n = number of fixations 
t = total cumulative fixation
average
p = total possible fixation time
, The results of the ratio or rate of fixation are presented in
Table VIII and the analysis of variance in Table IX.
"Face without both eyes" gave a ratio significantly different from 
all other conditions. No other conditions were statistically 
significant as to degree of difference. When rate was compared with the 
first and longest fixations a high negative correlation was obtained in 
both cases. (first and ratio: r = -0.8756; longest and ratio: 
r = -0.9329.) Even though rate (as calculated above) is not completely 
independent of the first or of the longest fixations, such a high
correlation would appear to be more than a statistical artifact. None­
theless its meaning remains ambiguous. Rate of looking gave the least 
differentiable results.
To determine whether there was a possible change in responsiveness
correlated with serial position, Jonckheere's trend test against ordered
alternatives was employed for the first, average longest and average 
cumulative fixation times. Since some first fixations were also the 
longest, the analysis of first fixations fixation excluded those fixations 
which were both longest and first. None of the results for the three 
measures was significant (first fixation p<.36, longest fixation p<.43, 
total fixation p<.13). Therefore, it can be concluded that neither 
habituation nor practice affected responsiveness across subjects for any 
of the three measures in question.
Since there was no significant change in responsiveness associated 
with serial position, it was assumed that the distribution of scores was 
normal so that sex differences could be tested for. Jonckheere’s trend 
test indicated a significant difference between the groups of males and 
females for average longest fixation (p<.008) and for cumulative fixation 
(p<.003) but not for first fixation (p<.31). Males as a group tended to 
habituate whereas females as a group, to the contrary, tended to become 
more responsive. However, when individual scores are considered, only 
three of the six males and two of the eight females showed a significant 
change in responsiveness for cumulative fixation. The three males showed 
habituation at a low level of significance(l. p<.017, 2. p<.013,
3. p<.05), but of the two females only one showed a tendency to increase
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responsiveness (p<.0004) whereas the other gave significantly shorter 
fixations (p<.009). Statistically significant changes in longest 
fixation for individual infants were given only by four infants, two 
females and two males. Though males as group showed decreased responsive­
ness and females increased, only one of the four significant individual 
scores, given by a male, was a result of habituation (p<.015). The two 
females (1. p<.036, 2. p<.0001) and the other male (p<.016) showed a 
definite tendency for the longer fixations to be associated with later 
serial position. Of the five infants who showed significant changes for 
cumulative fixation and of the four for average longest fixation, only two 
infants showed it for both. That is, of the nine scores, five were 
provided by different infants, the remaining four by the same two.
Obviously, there is a great deal of individual difference.
The overall sex differences may be an artifact of individual differences. 
When cumulative fixation was the measure, four males gave progressively 
lesser responses and two, greater} -while five females gave lesser and three 
greater. When first fixation was the measure, five males (that is, all 
but one) gave lesser responses, while six females gave greater and only 
two lesser. Nonetheless, other experimenters (Kagan and Lewis, 1965;
Meyers and Cantor, 1967, Caron and Caron, 1969; Freedman, Nagy and 
Carpenter, 1970; Greenberg and Weizmann, 1971) have noted that males 
habituate more readily than females, though the contrary has also been 
recorded (Haith, 1966; Caron, 1968; Weizmann, Cohen and Pratt, 1971). 
Evaluation of Hypotheses in Terms of Experimental Results
There appears to be sufficient evidence to accept the first hypothesis 
that "face without both eyes" would receive significantly less fixation 
than all other conditions. As can be seen from the planned comparisons 
in the analysis of variance, "face without both eyes" in fact did receive 
significantly less fixation (p<.001) than any other condition. Moreover, 
this difference was constant no matter what measure was considered, be it 
first fixation, average or absolute longest fixation, average cumulative 
fixation or even rate of fixation.
The second hypothesis that "full face" would not be fixated 
significantly more or less frequently than "face without the nose and 
mouth" or "without hair and forehead" can also be considered as confirmed, 
even though "face without hair and forehead".was found to be signifcantly 
different from "full face" and "face without nose and mouth" for one of
the four measures. Curiously,"face without outline" could be inferred 
not to be different from the three previously mentioned conditions for 
one measure only, average longest fixation.
The third hypothesis that "eyes only" would be significantly less 
fixated than "full face", "face without nose and mouth" and "without 
hair and forehead", was substantiated by three of the four measures. In 
the case of the first fixation, "eyes only" were significantly different 
in amounts of fixation only from "full face" and "face without nose and 
mouth" but not any other conditions except "face without both eyes".
The fourth hypothesis that "face without one eye" would be 
significantly less frequently fixated than all other conditions, except 
perhaps "face without both eyes", was not substantiated. Instead, it 
can be inferred that "face without one eye" was always fixated less 
frequently than "full face" or "face without nose and mouth" and usually 
less (except when first fixation was the measure) than "face without hair 
and forehead". Though "face without one eye" was more frequently fixated 
for all measures than was "face without both eyes", it could not be 
distinguished in this study from the "eyes only" or from "face without 
outline".
The fifth hypothesis that "face without outline" would be fixated 
less frequently than the remaining conditions, except, perhaps "eyes 
only", "face without one eye" and "without both eyes", was partially 
substantiated. For no measure were "face without outline" and "eyes 
only" distinguishable in terms of fixation elicited, nor were they 
different from "face without one eye". However, these three conditons 
were always significantly different from "full face" and from "face 
without nose and mouth" for all measures, though only from "face without 
hair and forehead" for two of the four measures. When the first 
fixation was the measure, then "face without outline" and "eyes only" 
were indistinguishable from "face without hair and forehead", but when 
average longest fixation was the measure, "face without one eye" and 
"eyes only" were distinguishable from "full face", "face without nose and 
mouth" and "without hair and forehead", though "face without outline" 
was not differentiable from these latter three conditions nor from the 
former two.
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The sixth hypothesis that there would be a negative reaction to 
the "face without both eyes", received further confirmation. Of 9 
infants who cried during testing, 7 cried for the first time to the 
condition "face without both eyes". Since the absence of eyes occurred 
6 times (when both sides are considered) out of 19 paired presentations, 
a quadratic equation was used to determine the probability of such an 
occurrence. The formula yielded p = .000035 and it therefore seems 
relatively safe to conclude that absence of eyes continued to be 
associated with negative affect in infants. One infant covered its own 
eyes with its bib in response to the eyeless face; another hid its 
eyes with its hands; still another closed its eyes.
In order to see whether absence of eyes had a residual effect, an 
analysis of variance was done to compare a possible difference between 
any condition immediately prior to the "face without both eyes" and any 
condition immediately subsequent. On the one hand, it might be 
postulated that the baby would not look at the subsequent condition as 
continued "avoidance" of the absence of eyes. On the other, it could be 
that the baby would fixate progressively longer any subsequent 
condition which contained the eyes in an attempt to get rid of the 
"bad experience" associated with absence of eyes. Neither hypothesis 
was substantiated, however. Mean cumulative fixations for conditions 
prior to and subsequent to the absence of the eyes were virtually 
identical across subjects.
Infants who cried in response to the absence of the eyes were 
frequently infants who were unable to complete the test, perhaps because 
of crying or perhaps because of less developed visual behaviour. It 
appeared that an infant who could "defend" himself either by covering his 
face or by looking away was less likely to cry than an infant who could 
not. Infants who did cry seemed more position bound or even stimulus 
bound than infants who did not; i.e., the looking behaviours of infants 
who cried did not seem as much under their own control as that of infants 
who did not cry. These results are compatible with the observation of 
the "active looking away" which was noted in the pilot study. As has been 
mentioned previously, stimuli in the main study were paired, therefore 
"looking away" was not always differentiable from "looking to" another 
stimulus.
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When one considers the extremely low cumulative fixation time for 
"face without both eyes" in comparison to the high rate of looking and 
to the negative reactions mentioned, it would appear that "absence of 
both eyes" was not something infants "liked" to look at but felt 
"compelled" to look at, perhaps as if an eyeless face was strange or 
threatening. It is emphasised, however, that "absence of only one eye" 
was not differentiable from behaviour associated with the face under all 
other conditions when both eyes were present.
The seventh hypothesis was definitely confirmed. In the pilot study, 
the stimuli were fixated in the following order of increasing magnitude;
. (1) F-2E: (2) E only; (3) F-H; (4) FF; (5) F-NM
In the main study, the following order of increasing magnitude was
obtained for the same conditions (new conditions omitted).
(1) F-2E; (2) E only; (3) F-H; (4) F-NM; (5) FF
It is to be noted that these two orderings are exactly the same except
for the last two conditions which in both studies were found not to be 
significantly different.
An important question is whether infants responded to the filmed face 
as they did to a real face. Evidence from other sources indicates that 
infants can and do differentiate solid from flat objects, therefore, one 
would expect the infants to be able to distinguish a three-dimensional 
face from a filmed version of it (Bower, 1966, 1971.) Nonetheless, 
results obtained in the main study, especially when compared with the 
results of the pilot study, (in which a real face as the stimulus) 
indicate that infants in the main study did respond to a face on television 
in a way which is not differentiable in terms of amount of looking from 
the way in whcih infants in the pilot study responded to a real or living 
face. Above all, the negative reaction to both a real "face without 
eyes" and to a filmed version of it, but not to other conditions, is most 
striking support of an interpretation that infants 16 weeks or older can 
"recognise" a filmed or televised version of a face as "face-like".
Incidental observations indicated, however, that infants could distinguish 
real from filmed faces. This finding is congruent with Bower’s (1966) 
observation that infants of this age and younger respond differently to 
a real object and to a two dimensional version of it. Even though infants 
smiled and vocalised to all filmed faces (except when both eyes were 
absent), they appeared to be more responsive to the real face, especially 
the mother’s. Yet a difference in infantile responsiveness may be 
due not to an ability to recognise the Gestalt of a filmed face as face-like
and at the same time to distinguish a_living face
from a filmed version of it, nor to a specific preference for the 
former, but to the responsiveness of the living face (in contrast to 
an unresponsive filmed version of it) and to the presence of colour.
DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
In the present study, a paired stimuli method of presentation 
was found to be completely ineffective for infants two months or under. 
However, by four months, some infants were capable of attending partially 
to paired stimuli, though in most cases a decided positional preference 
made the method virtually ineffective. Similar results were found by Ames 
and Silfen(1965)and by Greenberg, Uzgiris and Hunt(1971). Nonetheless, a 
very few infants were capable of attending simultaneously to two stimuli.
By way of incidental observation, the author noted that infants of 
four months or older who had had several experimental sessions became 
progressively more able to attend simultaneously to two stimuli. This 
observation suggests that at four months or after, an initial training 
or familiarization period may be necessary to acquaint infants with the 
technique of paired stimuli presentation. In other words, direct 
experience may be necessary if an infant is to discover that there are 
alternative stimuli from which he may choose. When two stimuli are of 
approximately equal degrees of complexity, then experience appears to 
offset positional biases. However, if two paired stimuli are radically 
different in terms of complexity, their complexity may outweigh 
positional preferences. It is unlikely that an infant younger than four 
months could make use of such training. It is about this age (i.e., 
four months) that Piaget describes a shift from looking for sensation's 
sake to looking to see, i.e. looking becomes environmentally orientated 
(Piaget, 1952). Naturally, when stimulation per se becomes more 
important than the effects it has, an infant attends to or selects among 
different sources of stimulation.
Some experimenters have recorded eye or head orientation as opposed 
to corneal reflections. Though there was a high correlation between the 
pilot study in which only eye orientations were recorded and the main 
study in which actual corneal reflections were measured, the author is 
convinced that the former method can at best be considered an 
approximation whereas the latter only can provide accurate data since it 
alone can specify definite criteria under which perception can be
defined operationally as occurring or not.
A further technical problem is that of transcribing live, i.e., 
blind or directly during an experimental session. According to the 
author's experience, it is practically impossible to transcribe 
accurately any sequence of eye movements without the aid of slow motion 
or of frame counting and without having studied in advance each sequence 
of movements. For any transcript to be reliable, it must be relatively 
free of mechanical and human error. In short, the transcriber must first 
be allowed to study the eye movements in question so as to establish 
separately from recording of fixations which eye movements meet the 
criteria of fixation. Moreover, if errors due to reaction time and the 
like are to be eliminated, records of rapid eye movements must be 
transcribed with the aid of slow motion or frame counting. Any other 
procedures of transcription would contain too many sources of possible 
error for a transcription to be considered anything more than an 
approximation.
Kagan, Henker, Hen-Tov, Levine and Lewis (1966) pointed out that if 
"preference" is to be equated with "long fixation" then there is no need 
to use the additional word "preference" which has implications much beyond 
relative length of fixation per se. Obviously, a stimulus may be looked 
at not because it is preferred, but because it is new, or because it is 
too difficult to categorize and therefore provokes an attempt to do so.
The logical basis of this criticism is irrefutable and for this reason 
supplementary measures are an advantage. However, in the present study, 
first, longest and cumulative fixation gave basically the same results.
In short, fixation seemed to be a fairly homogenous response for the 
infants in the author's sample.
In the pilot study, spontaneous smiling was found to be roughly 
correlated with cumulative fixation. Things that were looked at longer 
were more likely to be smiled at. If one assumes that an infant smiles 
at what he 'prefers', then cumulative fixation is in some way a gross, 
primitive indication of "preference". Complimentarily, both refusal to 
continue to look at and crying at that which was fixated least seemed to 
indicate dislike. Nonetheless, smiling and looking can be differentiated. 
As Wilcox (1969) points out, smiling and looking are separate response 
systems and have separate courses of development. Some stimuli elicited
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approximately equal amounts of fixation but were not equally frequently 
smiled at. Obviously, equal fixation times do not presuppose an 
inability to discriminate, nor a lack of preference.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Reactions to "face without both eyes" either of crying or of looking 
away and/or covering the face can be considered as aversion or dislike.
It is most noteworthy that such a negative reaction occurred to both a 
living and a filmed face. The refusal to look, in particular, suggests 
that infants had an expectancy of seeing eyes, perhaps as a result of 
association with surrounding facial features. In other words, infants of
three to four months act as if they have either a primitive notion,
internal representation or memory trace of certain configurations which 
belong together. Since infants also cried in response to a stimulus in 
which the expectancy of seeing eyes was appropriate but unfulfilled, it
seems plausible that the absence of eyes is more than just an
insufficient stimulus. To the contrary, it appears that a "face without 
eyes" is either disappointing or perhaps even infuriating. On the one 
hand, such an aversive reaction could be cognitive in origin, i.e. the 
result of a frustrated scan path (Noton & Stark, 1971) or an interrupted 
TOTE (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960) in which a 'set' expectancy is 
not met. On the other hand, it could be reaction of a fearful and/or 
anxious nature in response to either a 'novel' and/or 'horrifying' 
stimulus. Obviously, these alternatives are not mutually exclusive.
Ahrens (1954) observed that by five to six months artificial eyes 
worn on a real face elicited negative responses, whereas previously they 
had evoked smiling. Brackbill (1958) observed that once an infant had 
been conditioned to smile to a responsive adult face, he refused even to 
look at that face during the extinction process when it no longer 
responded to his smiles. She described an infant's refusal to look as 
quite active. If he could not turn his head, then he would avert his 
eyes. Studies by Caron (1967) and by Rovee and Rovee (1969) offer 
evidence that infants four months and under become progressively more 
responsive to a stimulus, changes in which are directly contingent upon 
their own behaviour. In other words, infants respond to feedback. Not 
only do they look more frequently at a responsive stimulus, but they also 
vocalize, laugh and wave their limbs excitedly. In short, infants appear 
to derive pleasure from a stimulus which responds to them. By contrast.
infants respond negatively to a previously "responsive" stimulus 
when it ceases to respond. Infants fretted, squirmed or even cried.
Thus, it is possible that infants grow to "prefer" stimuli which 
provide feedback. It may even be that feedback is intrinsically 
reinforcing. The rewarding properties of feedback may be viewed as 
the Functionsliîst -described by Biihler (1928) or the pleasure inherent 
in the functioning of cognitive structures described by Piaget(1952). 
However, infants' negative reactions to the cessation of feedback 
clearly suggest that they have a definite expectancy of feedback, that 
this expectancy is appetative in nature, and that whenever this 
exceptancy is appropriate,the absence of feedback is experienced as 
frustration.
Without exception, infants spent more time looking at a living or 
filmed face which contained eyes than one without them. In fact, the 
presence of the eyes alone was sufficient to elicit looking. This fact 
suggests that eyes are a necessary or even a central feature to which 
infants respond when scanning or focusing on a stimulus configuration 
which is potentially a facial Gestalt. Nonetheless, eyes plus some 
other part of the face, be it either "hair and forehead" or "nose and 
mouth", received more fixation than "eyes only". Thus, eyes alone seem 
to constitute a minimally sufficient stimulus, though not an optimal one. 
While a more complete face was fixated more frequently than a less 
complete, there is no evidence that a full or naturally complete face 
was looked at any more frequently than a partial face which contained 
eyes. In light of these findings, it is not possible to consider the 
face as a "privileged Gestalt" as far as looking is concerned. The 
present evidence suggests a heterogeneous summation effect centred 
around "privileged features", namely, the eyes. Both eyes are not 
necessary, one eye* is sufficient, though only in some cases is a face 
with both eyes more efficient in eliciting fixation than a face with only 
one. In fact, " F.ace with one eye only" was not fixated significantly 
more or less than "eyes only" or "face without outline", conditions which 
contain both eyes. Hence, it appears that the eye is to be considered as 
a structure "interesting" or "focal" per se and not as a paired or 
balanced part of a greater Gestalt.
The centrality of the eyes may be due to the fact that they are 
the most light reflective part of a natural face; that they contain 
great contrast within themselves and in relation to surrounding facial 
features; that they are in continuous movement; that they are the 
most responsive part of the face, registering changes more quickly and 
more consistently than other parts.
In an informal experiment, a mother was asked to get her infant’s 
attention and then to talk to it. The infant smiled at the talking face 
when nose and mouth were masked, but when both eyes were masked the 
infant gave a definite impression of being "confused" or even "perplexed" 
by the talking, eyeless face.
In the pilot study, "artificial outline" received the most fixation, 
even more than "full face", though the degree of difference was not 
significant. Moreover, "artificial outline" received the most smiles. 
However, the implications of responses to this condition were 
questionable due to its physical construction. As has been said, this 
condition was replaced with a face which had the outline actually 
removed. In the main study, "face without outline" was fixated much 
less frequently at a significant level for three of the four measures 
than were "full face" or "face without nose and mouth". By contrast,
"face without outline" was never distinguishable from "eyes only".
This finding suggests on the one hand that "nose and mouth" are not 
crucial if fixation is to take place and on the other that the outline 
itself is not as important as the features. For one measure even, "face 
without outline" was not distinguishable from "full face" or from any 
other conditions except "face without both eyes".
If, as is maintained, an infant of four months can recognise various 
combinations of facial features as being face like and if he has an 
expectancy of seeing eyes in a stimulus configuration which is potentially 
a face, then it can be inferred thar there is an internalized face- 
schema in terms of which incomplete facial features are "seen" to be 
face-like.
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PLATE I: FACE WITHOUT BOTH EYES
PLATE II: FACE WITHOUT ONE EYE
I
PLATE III: EYES ONLY
PLATE IV: PAGE WITHOUT OUTLINE
PLATE V: PAGE WITHOUT HAIR AND POREHEAD
PLATE VI: PAGE WITHOUT NOSE AND MOUTH



























































DIAGRAM OP AN EYE WHICH GAN BE CON­
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OP AN INFANT'S REACTIONS
TO THE HUMAN PACE
The Problem of Imprinting
Lorenz (1935) observed that incubator hatched goslings reacted to him as 
though he were the natural parent figure. That is , they followed him , tried  
to remain close to him and showed signs of distress if they could not. When 
adult, these same birds frequently attempted to court him. Obviously, 
something had gone wrong. A human being is an inappropriate maternal or 
sexual object for a goose. One implication of the "mistake" was that at least 
for certain species neither recognition of the mother nor choice of sexual 
partner was innate in the sense of "built in before birth".
Naturalistic experiments and observation led Lorenz to conclude that 
goslings, ducklings and many other nidifugous species of birds have a 
propensity to follow the f irs t moving object present after hatching. In the 
average expectable environment, this moving object would most probably be 
the mother bird, i. e. an egg which has not been incubated by a hen would not 
hatch, and therefore, the presence of tiie hen at the time of hatching would be 
highly like ly , if not inevitable, as far as most chicks, ducklings or the like  
are concerned. However, laboratory hatched birds, were observed to follow 
and la ter in life  to attempt to court such diverse objects as a ball, a cube, a 
wooden decoy, or s im ilar inappropriate objects. In short, it appeared that 
the mere presence of a moving object was all that was needed for newely 
hatched birds to learn its characteristics and to become attached to it. Lorenz 
labelled this early form  of learning "imprinting". In contrast to other types 
of learning in which an organism changes the use or application of already 
existing structures, imprinting was considered to involve the formation of
structures. In classical psychoanalytic language, it could be formulated as 
the formation of the Ego in contrast to introjected objects and/or memories 
which la ter would be contained in the Ego.
Lorenz' initia l observations led him to conclude that imprinting (1) had 
irre v e rs ib le  effects, (2) took place only in a critical period which was 
lim ited in tim e, (3) was supra-individual tearing, and (4) influenced patterns 
of behaviour which were yet to develop in an organism's repertoire.
In other words, imprinting could be considered like "acquired instinct", i. e. 
certain types of responses are built into an organism as a result of experience 
in such a way that once the "building-in" has taken place, it  is impossible 
thereafter to distinguish them from responses built-in  genetically. Above 
a ll,  imprinting was seen as essentially different from ordinary learning in so 
fa r as imprinting could only take place in a brief or critical period and was 
irreversable, i. e. could not be forgotten. Unlike classical or operant 
conditioning, no practice was considered necessary. Moreover, there was 
no reward in the conventional sense of the word. Instead, imprinting appeared 
to be the result of an intrinsic propensity for young birds to follow a moving 
object. Lorenz considered the moving object to trigger an Innate Releasing - g 
Mechanism which elicited the following and brought about the preference for 
or bound to the object followed. Evolution was described as having provided 
sign-stim uli which release specific bu ilt-in  responses in a way analageous to 
a key fitting into and opening a lock. Metaphorically, imprinting could be seen 
as a form  of phylogenetic adaption, i. e. pre-adaption on the ontogenetic level 
as a result of species
Zoologists and psychologists the world over were impressed with the possible 
importance of Lorenz' findings, though many were highly critical of his 
experimental procedures, or what they considered to be a lack of them. 
Therefore, experiments were undertaken to attempt (i) to examine the actual 
parameters which influence imprinting, (ii) to determine the dimensions of the 
critica l period and (iii) to assess the la ter effects of die early experience in 
question. Naturally, if  a problem is closely scrutinised, it is discovered 
to be more complex then previously thou^t.
When Ramsey and Hess (1954) compared the strength of imprinting and the 
effort expended by ducklings in following a wooden decoy, they concluded that
there was a positive relationship between strength of imprinting and amount 
of effort expended in following the object imprinted to. The harder a duckling 
"worked", the better it  imprinted. Experimental birds were induced to run up 
inclined planes and to jump hurdles in order to keep in contact or proximity 
witli a wooden decoy. Hess (1957, 1958, 1959a, 1959c, 1962) formulated a 
"law of effort" which predicted the strength of imprinting as a function of effort 
expended during the critical period. He even hypothesized that it was effort on 
part of the subject which "caused" imprinting to talie place.
Experiments by other researchers have not substantiated Hess's 
conclusion. To the contrary, Baer and Gray (19Ô0) were able to im print chicks 
to guinea pigs which were separated from  the chicks by glass so that following 
was impossible. M oltz(1963)restricted the movements of ducklings by putting 
them in boxes; nonetheless, they s till imprinted. Jaynes (1958a) and Smith 
(1962) found s im ilar results. Obviously, movement of the subject is not a 
sufficient factor. However, the fact that effort is not prerequisite does not 
affect the finding that it may aid or strengthen imprinting. What must be 
distinguished are the m inim ally sufficent and the optimal conditions for 
imprinting. Movement of the subject is an optimal condition, while orientation 
of the subject is the m inim ally sufficient condition.
As has been said, it  was originally thought that imprinting could only occur 
i f  a moving object were present at the critical time (Lorenz, 1935). However, 
James (1959, 1960a, 1960b) and Smith (1960) were able to imprint newly hatched 
birds to interm ittent stimuli which were two-dimensional. Moreover, Gray 
(1960) successfully imprinted chicks to a static figure. Compatible results 
were found by Sluckin (1960,1962). Therefore, it can be concluded that neither 
real nor artifica l movement of the object (i. e. stimulus to be imprinted to ) is 
necessary. In other words, heterogeneously patterned stimuli constitute the 
m inim ally sufficient conditions for imprinting to take place as regards the 
environment. An interm ittent source of light or an actual animal would, of 
course, provide more optimal environmental conditions. However, the mere  
presence of stimulation, of something to orientate to, seems to be enough.
Hinde (1961) listed the number and type of different objects which could be 
imprinted on. He emphasised that in the young bird tiiere is "in itia lly  a weak 
tendency to respond to a fa ir ly  wide range of objects and sounds". This tendency 
is tlien "primed by practice and conditioned to the characteristics of the
particular objects which have elicited the response". In itia lly , the tendency to 
flee is low; at the same tim e, the tendency to follow is strong. Later, v/hcn 
the tendency to flee becomes stronger, it is more likely that a new object w ill 
be rim away from rather than approached. Hinde stressed that "imprinting 
to an object involves not only an increased specifity in responsiveness and an 
increased tendency to respond to the object when it is present, but also an 
increase in the intensity of appetitive behaviour shown when the object disappears". 
Hinde differed from Lorenz, however, that sexual choice is a characteristic of 
imprinting just because it  may be a consequence of it. Furtherm ore, Hinde 
quoted his own research (Hinde, Thorpe and Vince, 1965) and that of others 
(Fabricius, 1951; Ramsey and Hess, 1954) to demonstrate that objects which 
elic it following in newly hatched nidifugous birds may also elic it fear. In this 
connection, he emphasised that a young bird does not become attached to the 
species but to specific parent figures. Since parent birds usually care only for 
their own young and attack those of others, it  is necessary for the young to be 
capable of intra-species differential recognition. Amongst canabalistic fowl 
such as sea gulls, the ability to discriminate the caretaking figure(s) is 
imperative for survival.
Though Hinde (1961) specifically warned against a direct comparison of one 
species with another, especially of birds wiüi mammals, he pointed out that 
sim ilarities of behaviour are more like ly  to be a product of s im ilar 
evolutionary selective forces than of s im ilar organismic mechanisms. Nonetheless, 
he was w illing to demarcate certain s im ilarities of development acrosss 
species: f irs t a general responsiveness, then a specific responsiveness to 
the parent or caretaking figure, next the emergence of fear and la te r aggresion. 
However , Hinde did not consider the establishment of a mother off-spring  
relationship in birds to be a special form  of learning. He stressed the 
lim itations of a rather rig id concept of an Innate Releasing Mechanism and 
advised Üiat "many of the characteristics of imprinting in birds can be 
understood in functional terms" and can be considered sim ilar to other learning 
processes.
I t  is practically impossible to compare the sim ilarities of imprinting and 
other learning processes since there is no generally accepted view of what 
learning actually is. A Pavlovian, Skinnerian or Hullian
conception of learning is very different from a Piagetian or Harlowian, and 
these from  a Gutherian, Tolmanian orKohlerian. Though Hinde advised that 
imprinting qua phenomenon is not categorically different from other forms of 
learning qua phenomena, it needs to be emphasised that the implications drawn 
by ethologists are very different from those drawn from other forms of learning  
by behaviouralists. However, i f  imprinting were to be compared phenomeno- 
logically with other forms of learning, Hinde would contend that it is best to 
postulate a continuum rumiing from behaviour which is environmentally stable 
to behaviour which is environmentally labile. Imprinting would then be 
conceptualized as a form  of learning which occurs during an environmentally 
labile period and which afterwards becomes relatively stable environmentally.
Though Hinde (1961,1963) conceded that "all learning is more likely to occur 
at some stages in the life  cycle tiian it is at others", he did not deem it  useful 
to ask whether imprinting occurs in species other than birds, but he did consider 
it  legitim ate to ask whether a given type of learning occurs within a sensitive 
period, and if  it does, what lim its that period.
hi contrast to Hinde, Thorpe (1961) argued for a concept of imprinting 
extended beyond the original and narrower formulation by Lorenz. Instead of 
one global type of imprinting specifically concerned with the formation of 
parent off-spring attachment, Thorpe described at least three types of imprinting;
(a) Imprinted recognition of and response to specific patterns 
of visual stimulation^
(b) Imprinted recognition of and response to specific frequency 
patterns of auditory stimulation (fine periodicities or 
patterns))
(c) Imprinted recognition of and response to specific gross 
periodicities (rhythms) of stimulation.
Classical imprinting in the natural environment would be an example of 
types (a) and (b), i. e. visual and auditory imprinting. In both cases, 
recognition is a prerequisite for and different from any imprinted responses.
The experimental findings of Smith (1960) and of James (1959), quoted above, 
are compatible with the notion that imprinting to only a visual stimulus can 
occur. Moreover, quieting to, recognition of and approaching a source of 
auditory stimulation have been reported by numerous investigators (Fabricius, 
1951a, 1951b; Collias and Collias, 1956; Sluckin and Salzen 1961; Klopfer, 1959a, 
1959b). Thorpe (1956, 1958a, 1958b) and Hinde (1958) offer evidence that
in the chaffinch there is a sensitive phase for the acquisition of the species 
song, in otherwords imprinting to auditory stimuli.
Further evidence for different types of imprinting come from  Schütz (1963,
1965a, 1965b, 1970, 1971) and Immelmann (1969). The sensitive phase for 
"sexual imprinting" occurs later than that for imprinting to a mother figure 
and forms the basis of a bird's erotic attachment to a species, but 
wiüiout regard to gender . The sensitive phase for the imprinting on male or 
female members of a species comes la ter than both maternal or species 
imprinting and can result in homosexual fixations.
Originally, the period in which imprinting took place was considered critical 
in two aspects: (1) lim ited in tim e, and (2) irreversib le  in effect.
Ramsey and Hess (1954) delineated what they hoped to be the incipient and terminal 
temporal lim its  of sensitivity for ducklings. However, experiments by Guiton 
(1958), by James (1960a, 1960b) and by Moltz and Stettner (1961) offer clear 
evidence that the "period of responsiveness can be appreciably extended" by 
a variety of experimental manipulations.
Various theories have been proposed to explain the termination of the optimal 
. period. Kaufman and Hinde (1961) have classified these into four categories:
1. Maturational end of sensitivity
2. Inhibition through socialization
3. Growth of tim idity and/or fear
4. End of low anxiety state
Sluckin (1965) points out that maturational age cannot be excluded as a 
terminating or lim iting factor if the concept of maturation is interpreted 
narrowly. It  is self-evident that no maturational period can be indefinitely 
extended. No organism is infinitely malleable. Thorpe (1961) has shown that 
the sensitive phase for learning of the species song in the chaffinch can be 
brought to an end without imprinting taking place. I f ,  however, the concept of 
maturation is interpreted more widely, then it  cannot be considered a sufficent 
"factor. -The above mentioned studies by Guiton (1959), by James (1960) and by 
Moltz and Stettner (1961) testify that the period can in fact be extended.
Obviously, it is not a question of either environmental influences or maturation 
but of an interaction of both.
Inhibition through socialization as a terminating factor implies that 
imprinting continues so long as no firm  imprinting has talc en place. This 
formulation can be only partia lly  tenable. As quoted above, Thorpe (1961)
demonstrated that the "sensitive" period could be brought to a close without 
imprinting having taken place, in which case termination could in no way be 
effected by the learning of an incompatible responses. Nonetheless, it  is 
obvious that the formation of "approach and followmg responses to any stimulus 
configuration tend to inhibit approach and imprinting to new figures" (Sluckin 
1965). Like maturation, inhibition through socialization can be said to 
contribute to the termination of the optimal period in certain circumstances , 
though neither can be said to be a sufficient explanation in itself.
It  has long been known that fear of a figure inliibits approach and for this 
reason fear has been widely accepted as a terminating factor (Hess 1957,
1959b; Hinde, 1955b). Hov/ever, fearfulness is not a prim ary response for it  
can be shown to be dependent on strangeness (Moltz and Stettner, 1961;
Salzen, 1962). Obviously, since it  takes time for stimuli to become fam ilia r, 
it  also takes tim e before non-fam iliar stimuli can be perceived as strange 
(Schaller and Emlen , 1962). Excluded, of course, is fear of or withdrawal 
from  overwlielmingly intensive stimulation. "Whether maturation is or is not an 
important factor in the development of fearfulness, the tendency to flee from  
strange objects must be acquired in so far as 'knowledge' of what is strange 
is acquired" (Sluckin, 1965). If ,  however, avoidance or flight is taken as 
a criterion of fear, then birds can be imprinted to a "feared" object 
(Frabicius, 1951a; Jaynes, 1957; Weidmann, 1958; Guiton, 1959; Sluckin and 
Salzen, 1961). However, due to confusion of "fear" as a subjective state and 
of behaviour which is frequently considered to be "fearful", the role of "fear" 
remains ambiguous.
Moltz (1960) postulated newly hatched chick to be in a state of low anxiety 
which then became associated with à moving object. On the one hand, there is 
no em pirical evidence that newly hatched chicks are in a state of low anxiety 
(Salzen and Tom lin, 1963). On the other hand, such an explanation is unnecessary, 
i f  not even untestable. U ltim ately , it  derives from  an assumption that "all 
learning must be reinforced or associated with drive-reduction". I t  is 
superfluous to postulate hypotlietical drives when none are evident. One of the 
salient characteristics of imprinting has always been the lack of rewards in the 
conventional sense. Thus, it  is contradictory to propose them. I t  would be 
equally logical to argue that a newly hatched chick was in a high state of anxiety 
as a result of a phenomenon s im ilar to the alleged "trauma of b irth '.
The most plausible explanation for the end of the optimal period has been put 
forward by Salzen (1962) and Sluckin (1962): "imprinting ends as a result of 
imprinting". Though this statement may sound circu lar, the implication is 
that imprinting is an auto-terminating process. That is: the limitations of 
maturational flex ib ility , interacting with environmental influences, solidified 
by the formation of responses incompatible with the formation of sim ilar  
subsequent responses, coupled v/ith the awareness of novelty and the growth 
of fear, preclude the formation of alternative attachments. In short, there 
appears to be "a gradual change in the probability that imprinting w ill occur, 
depending on both the conditions of rearing and the test procedure" (Kaufman 
and Hinde, 1961).
Aristotle posed a s im ilar problem of causation in his Metaphysics. The 
argument can be paraphrased as follows: If  a boy drops a stone on a piece of 
glass and the glass brakes, what is the cause? Is it  the weight of the stone, 
the brittleness of the glass, his positioning of the stone over the glass or his 
releasing the stone? Obviously, it  is not a question of one single or ultimate 
cause. Rather, there are multiple determinants which interact, none of which 
is sufficient alone.
Lorenz (1935) considered the sensitive period to be critica l because the 
results of imprinting appeared to be irreversib le in an all-or-nothing manner. 
Moreover, he believed courtship-fixations to result from the process 
responsible for mother-infant bonding. Schütz (1963, 1965a, 1965b, 1970,1971,) 
however,has shown that the sensitive periods for imprinting of sexual and gender 
choices are different from  that of infantile bonding to the maternal figure. 
Therefore, it is no longer possible to consider courtship fixations as examples 
of the irrevers ib ility  of imprinting to a maternal object. Nonetheless, it  is 
worth noting the courtship fixations are not necessarily as irreversib le as 
once thought (Guiton, 1962; Fisher and Hale, 1957; Wood-Gush, 1958).
Irrevers ib ility  of imprinting to a maternal object can be considered in terms 
of durability of fe lia l responses. Salzen and Sluckin (1959b) observed that the 
duration of attachments were quite short under certain enviromnental 
circumstances. Jaynes (1958a) also found this to be the case. Thus,Sluckin 
(1965) and Guiton (1961) concluded tliat "stability of attachment appeared to be 
a function of the extent of in itia l experience". In other words, imprinting must be 
considered a more or less and not an all-or-nothing phenomenon and therefore not
irrevers ib le  though frequently quite stable.
As a point of interest, it  is to be noted that the terms "imprinting" (when 
denoting an infant's bond to a mother figure) and "attachments" are frequently 
used interchangeably in the literature.
Imprinting-lüve phenomena have been observed to occur in species other than 
nidifugous birds, e .g . hi guinea pigs (Shipley, 1963), in puppies (Broadbeck, 
1954; Scott, 1958, 1962), in sheep and goats (Scott, 1945; Herscher, Richmond 
and Moore, 1963) and in monlieys (Harlow, 1958, 1959,1960,1961,1962,1963; 
Harlow and Harlow, 1962,1969; Harlow and Zimmermann, 1958,1959).
Sluckin (1965) pointed out that a "baby-monkey’s in itia l exposure to its mother 
ties it  to her, much as the chicks early experience ties it to the mother hen”, 
and that the "behaviour of a frightened cloth-mother attacked monliey . . .  is 
strickingly s im ilar to that of a frightened moving-box imprinted chick".
When Harlow gave infant monlceys the choice between spending time on a 
lactating w ire surrogate or on a non-lactating, contact-comfort, cloth 
surrogate, they all "preferred" the cloth to the w ire. Obvious, drive reduction 
or reinforcement could not be considered a sufficient concept to explain the 
attachment of an infant monliey to its mother or mother surrogate. With the 
exception of one, every surrogate, whether wire or cloth, was fitted with 
an a rtific ia l head containing monlcey-like features. In the one case, however, 
the head was blanlc or featureless. When the faceless head was replaced with 
a faced head, the young monlcey in question turned the features away from  him , 
so that only'the featureless back would be visible. Thus it  appears tliat 
monkeys do im print on conditions as specific as the maternal face. Harlow's 
findings are most interesting because monlceys are evolutionary closer to man 
than are birds and therefore perm it better cross species comparisons.
There has been a great deal of controversy about the possibility of 
imprinting in the human infant. Gray (1958) designated a "critical period" 
to begin about six weeks with what he considered the onset of learning 
ability and to end at six months or so with the precursors of stranger anxiety 
or fear. M oreover, Gray held the smiling response in the human infant to 
be a motor equivalent of following in birds.
Ambrose (1963) criticised Gray on the grounds (1) tliat his definition of 
imprinting differed considerably from the concept generally held by ethologists, 
and (2) that his conclusions presupposed more evidence than he was able to
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present. Nonetheless, Ambrose found certain aspects of Gray's equation of 
smiling and following to be plausible. Ambrose emphasised however, that his 
own aim was not to demonstrate imprinting in man, but m erely to show that 
"some phenomena often associated with imprinting are often to be found at a 
human level". Ambrose argued (1) that even though the smiling response may 
not be a motor equivalent of following these two responses, have a "close 
sim ilarity  of function" and (2) that a mother's eyes are the firs t figurai entity 
to be perceived consistently by an infant. He also stresses that eyes possess 
the best combination of qualities which attract an mfant's attention: "figure, 
small enough to be perceived with a minimum of multiple fixations, colour, 
albedo, movement and light-reflectance". In short, he considered tiie human 
eyes (in particular, those of an infant's caretaker) to be the lMs.'9?t6 HiLlnajm'g 
Meefeoiniom., i. e. the human equivalent of the firs t moving object seen in the 
average expectable environment of a newly hatched bird.
Using smiling as a functional equivalent of follovnng, Ambrose observed 
that Infants do not respond to a human face before eleven weeks or so. Three  
to four weeks la te r, the readiness to smile to a ll faces reaches a peak. The 
strength of tiiis general or indiscriminate responsiveness soon talces a sharpe 
decline, which was interpreted as due to the begiiming of the ability to 
descriminate strangers’ faces from  the mother's. With the onset of 
discriminative smiling, Ambrose desigiated supra-individual learning to be 
at an end. Hinde (1963), however, criticised Ambrose on the grounds that 
"in itia l learning of the characteristics of the parent is not supra-individual 
learning".
Wolff (1963) observed smiling in home-reared American infants, though he 
made no reference to imprinting. He observed that during the f irs t week 
"sm iling can be elicited during irregu lar sleep and drowsiness by a variety of 
sounds" such as a high pitched brass bell, an Audubon bird whistle and a high 
pitched voice. By the second week, a voice was noted to e lic it smiling more 
effectively than other stimuli. During the third week, infants gave their f irs t  
"social smile". Though infants were now capable of smiling when bright eyed 
and a lert, a human voice was still the most effective stimulus. I t  was only 
at about the fourth week that visual stimuli began to play a part in the eliciting  
of smiling. A t about the same time or shortly la te r, infants were firs t observed 
to focus on the eyes of an adult, i. e. , to make eye-to-eye contact. Thereafter
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smiling became a predictable and more selective response to a number of 
specific, highly articulated stimuli and achieved greater autonomy from  
organismic state. In other words, one montli old infants can definàtelÿ respond 
socially to visual stim uli, whereas previously Üiey could not. I t  is obvious, of 
course, that the ability to perceive a stimulus is prerequisite for imprinting  
to it.
Bowlby (1969) noted that when the term  "imprmting" is used in a generic 
sense, it implies (a) "the development of a clearly defined preference',' (b) " a 
preference which develops very quickly and usually during a lim ited phase of 
the life  cycle", and (c) "a preference tliat, once formed, remains comparatively 
fixed".
Hunt (1970) underlined the attentional factors involved in imprinting. He 
pointed out that "under at least certain conditions, perceptual encounters with 
objects, patterns, and places lead to perceptual preferaice for these fam ilia r  
objects, patterns, etc. , before they lead to preference for what is unfam iliar 
or novel". M oreover, he interpreted following behaviour to indicate that the 
object, pattern, etc. , which is visually orientated to is "preferred". However, 
Hunt was careful only to make a comparison between imprinting and other tjqies 
of learning.
If  imprinting is to be compared with other forms of learning, then it  must be 
realised that imprinting is always "early learning" and is presupposed by la ter  
learning from  which it  is different at least tem porarily. Learning when an 
organism is im m ature, i. e. when an organism is malleable and in the process 
of rapid growth, is different from  learning in a mature or already formed 
organism (Hebb, 1949). Since there are important anatomical differences 
between the brains of very young or immature and those of adult or mature 
organisms, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that form er d iffer from  the 
la tte r in the way they learn (Russell, 1959; Sluckin, 1965). Supporting evidence 
comes from  the work of Scott and Marston (1950), Biel (1940), Munn (1950),
James and Binks (1963), Vince (1958,1959,1960,1961). In fact, " it is the 
general conclusion of students of animal learning that younger individuals are  
better learners than are older ones" (Tliorpe, 1961).
Though there is little  agreement among authors as to just what learning is , 
it  can, for convenience sake, be defined as relatively lasting changes in 
behaviour resulting from  experience. The lasting character of behavioural
change as a definition of learning distinguishes it from changes associated 
with fatigue, stress, drugs, or the like. The experiential aspect of the 
definition precludes changes dependent on maturation or ageing.
Some authors distinguish learning and adaptation (Sluckin, 1965), however,
H a  get (1952) considers all forms of learning, especially cognitive, as special 
cases of biological adaptation.
The insightful behaviour of primates observed by ICohler (1925) is now 
attributed to "learning sets" or "learning how to learn" (Harlow, 1949), while 
both classical and operant conditioning are considered as training procedures 
and therefore not equatable with learning per se. Strategy and conceptual 
learning are poorly explained in terms of conditioning techniques. The same 
is true of imprinting.
Association, above all else, is held to be the salient criterion of conditioning 
(Morgan, 1961). But in a ll forms of conditioning "the pairing of stimuli and 
response is selective; either one out of a range of possible stimuli becomes 
associated with a given response, or one particular response becomes associated 
with some stimulus" (Sluckin, 1965). Im printing, however, starts with a bu ilt- 
in , unconditioned orientation response to a source of stimulation and is 
frequently, though not invariably, accompanied by an equally bu ilt-in , unconditioned 
approach response.
Classical or Pavlovian conditioning presupposes an unconditioned stimulus 
which evokes an unconditioned response (Pavlov, 1927, 1928). The unconditioned 
stimulus is then paired or associated in time with another stimulus, the 
conditioned stimulus. Training then consists of repeated presentations of the 
two stimuli. I f  an experimental animal responds in a manner same or s im ilar 
to the unconditioned stimulus when the conditioned stimulus alone is presented., 
i. e. without the unconditioned or eliciting stimulus, then that response is 
designated a conditioned response.
If  imprinting is to be compared with Pavlovian conditioning, then the social 
releasor or sign stimulus would be equated with the unconditioned stimulus and the 
orientation cum approach response witli the elicited or unconditioned response.
But the comparison falls down because there is nothing equal to a conditioned 
stimulus. In fact, imprinting can be used as a basis for classical unconditioning 
(James, 1959,1960a; Abercrombie and James, 1961; Klopfer, 1959b) in which 
case imprinting could not be an example of classical conditioning. That is: 'A ’
OF)
camiot be the basis of 'B' and be identical witli 'B' at the same time.
If ,  for argument salve, it is assumed that oritentation and approach responses 
are emitted and not elicited, then imprinting can be compared with operant or 
instrumental conditioning. However, further problems ensue. The paradigm  
of Skinnerian conditioning consists of a sequence of 1. an emitted response 
followed by 2. reinforcement. In some cases, a discriminative stimulus is 
present to "te ll" the experimental animal when to respond. The latter sequence 
is then: 1. discrim inative stimulus, 2. response, 3. reinforcement. In this 
case, the social releaser would be both discriminative stimulus and 
reinforcement. However, it  is nonsense for a reinforcement to precede 
an operant or emitted response. A reinforcement could precede a response 
only in classical conditioning, in which case a doubtful equation of unconditioned 
stimulus and reinforcement must be made.* Thus the paradigm of operant 
conditioning can be seen to be reducible to that of classical as fa r  as imprinting  
is concerned.
Operant responses decline or habituate when reinforcement is removed. This 
is not true of imprinting. However, it  is worth noting that operant responses 
are not considered to habituate but to be held in abeyance when the discriminative 
stimulus is absent. Therefore, if  imprinting were considered a form  of operant 
conditioning, then it  would be a paradoxical form  of it  because habituation would 
be impossible, and an important characteristic of anything that is learned (e. g. 
conditioned responses) is that it  can be forgotten (Blihler, 1927). Thus, it  is 
obvious that neither classical nor operant conditioning provide paradigm  
easily compatible with the phenomena of imprinting.
'In imprinting there is no external reinforcement". Nor is there a conditioned 
stimulus. "The releasing stimuli itself is attractive from  tlie start and becomes 
more attractive as the organism continues to be exposed to it". (Sluckin, 1965). 
By contrast, an unconditioned stimulus does not become more attraüve when 
paired with a conditioned stimulus. Likewise, a reinforcement does not become 
more reinforcing with training. Yet, Hinde, Thorpe and Vince (1956) claim
*  I f  an unconditioned stimulus is unconditioned, then it  is superfluous to employ 
another term  such as reinforcenient. I f  the two terms are synonymous, then 
nothing is added, but if  they are not synonymous then they are contradictory.
imprinting' to be self reinforcing. On ihe one hand, such a claim is 
anthropomorphic (Weiss, 1969); on the other, it is tautologous and therefore 
sui^erfluous: if  an miconditioned stimulus evokes a response, nothing is gained 
by defining that stimulus as reinforcing just because it evokes the response in 
question; likewise, if a discriminative stimulus signals the availability of 
reinforcement, then it is redundant to consider the signal as reinforcing.
Sluckin (1965) is explicit that "in so fa r as the term , reinforcement implies 
or suggests external reinforcement imprinting may be described as a form  
of non-reinforced learning". Foss (1963) characterised imprinting as "a 
discriminated preference for one object oTdeveloped in the absence of any 
conventional reinforcers". Above a ll, there is no "selective pairing of stimuli 
and responses" in imprinting as there is both types of conditioning. To the 
contrary, the in itia l bond between eliciting stimuli and imprinted responses 
is strengthened with experience and becomes exclusive. Since imprinting is 
a form  of learning in which selection is impossible, it can be described as a 
form  of non-associative learning, for association presupposes alternatives.
In both classical and operant conditioning, a response, either elicited or 
emitted, becomes associated with a stimulus, be it a conditioned stimulus or 
a reinforcement, witli which it was not previously associated. Though the 
notion of an Innate Releasing Mechanism can be overstated, it is exactly the 
non-selective phenomenon of releasing stimuli which differentiates imprinting  
from  associative learning. Conditioning always implies learning to respond to 
classes of stim uli, whereas imprinting to a maternal figure is just the opposite, 
i. e. learning to recognise and to respond to a specific stimulus. Thus, Vince 
(1960) considers learning to be too crude a concept for developmental changes, 
one of which is imprmting.
- Obviously, imprinting presupposes the ability in general to distinguish 
figure from  ground and in particular to differentiate between figures. It  also 
presupposes perceptual learning but differs from it in that "learning of the 
characteristics of the environment need not . . .  entail the formation of any 
attachments". Weidmann (1956) observed that non-imprinted birds would 
follow only when hungry and when left alone, showed no distress.
The ability to discriminate between fam iliar and novel or strange, which is 
a consequence of imprinting, appears to be acquired "not by conditioning but 
througji perceptual learning". (Sluckin and Salzen, 1961; Sluckin, 1962; 
Gibson, 1969; Hunt, 1970). In this connection, D r ever coined the expression
"exposure leam iug" which specifies both "the perceptual registration by the 
organism of the environment to which it is exposed" and "the fam iliarisation  
of the organism with its environment" (Sluckin, 1965).
Hess (1959a, 1959c, 1962b) considered primacy of experience to be 
fimdamental for imprinting, whereas recency for associative learning. Hinde 
(1962b) criticised Hess on the claim that it  is difficult to test the prim acy- 
recency hypothesis. Hov/ever, the well-loiown experiments concerning pro­
active and retro -active inhibition are em pirical statements of exactly this 
hyrpothesis.
As has been stated, following is not requisite for imprinting to talie place. 
Orientation to a source of stimulation is the m inim ally sufficient condition.
Thus exposure learning can be considered to underlie imprinting but cannot be 
equated with it ,  because imprinting is not just "learning of characteristics of 
a parent-object" (Baer and Gray, 1960), it is also the development of appetitive 
response to or "needs" for that • object. I t  is precisely the appetitve aspect 
of imprinting which distinguish it  from  other forms of learning.
On the one hand, imprinting is foundation or prim ary learning, i. e. learning  
upon which other or subsequent learning rests. On the other hand, imprinting 
is the actualisation of "desir" in the sense that a built-in  response finds its 
goal or object. Above a ll, imprmting is more than "simple" learning in so far 
as it  can be viewed as an acquired appetitive or motivational system. Moreover, 
i t  is a type of early learning lim ited to a relative brie f sensitive or optimal 
period.
Obviously, it  is fruitless to argue over the use of terms. Whether something 
is imprinting or is not can all too easily become a verbal argument. The label 
is not important. What is important is how two different species are s im ilar 
and different as regards a particular behaviour or function. Therefore the 
rest of this chapter wiU be concerned neither with the hypothetical critical or
' ^
lim ited nature of a sensitive period, not with the postulated characteristics of 
irrevers ib ility  or supra-individual learning. Rather, it  w ill be concerned with 
"imprinting" in die extended sense of tiie concept as used by Thorpe (1961) and 
in terms of the actual events and conditions specific to the development of 
preferences for a particular pattern of visual stimulation.
Hinde (1963) pointed outthat the result of the imprinting process is that an 
immature organism "learns to recognise its mother as an individual, and [that]
1a number of discrete responses made by the young animal . . .  became integrated 
on to one object".
Therefore, sim ilarities between the early development of attachment in humans 
and the initial phases of imprinting in birds w ill be dravm.
The human neonate is borne visually naive. To date, there is no convincing 
evidence that he is capable of innate recognition of the human face or of any 
other pattern. Rather, he is differentially sensitive to certain classes of 
stim uli which frequently emanate from a human source (Wolff, 1963; Bowlby, 
1969). The neonate can see, though his visual abilities are lim ited. Unlike the 
young of most other species, he is unable to follow or cling. Therefore, in 
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness he would most like ly  be almost 
continually held by his moüier (or another caretaker), whilst in modern 
European society, he may either lie  in a crib or be held. Just like the newly 
hatched bird, the newborn human infant eventually becomes attached to a 
specific member to his species, usually his caretalcer.
Bowlby (1969) lists eight points of s im ilarity  between the development 
of attachment in human infants and imprinting in birds:
(i) In  human infants social responses of every kind are f irs t elicited
by a wide array  of stimuli and are later elicited by a much narrower 
array , confined after some months to stimuli arising from one or a 
few particular individuals.
(ii) There is evidence of a marked bias to respond socially to certain
kinds of stimuli more than to others.
(iii) The more experience of social interaction an infant has with a 
person the stronger his attachment to that person becomes.
(iv) The fact that learning to discriminate different faces commonly 
follows periods of attentive staring and listening suggests that 
exposure learning may be playing a part.
(v) In most infants attachment behaviour to a p referrred  figure 
develops during the firs t year of life . I t  seems probable that 
there is a sensitive period in that year during which attachment 
behaviour develops most readily.
(vi) I t  is unlikely that any sensitive phase begins before about six 
weeks and it  may be some weeks later.
(vii) A fter about six months, and markedly so after eight or nine 
months, babies are more lilcely to respond to strange figures 
with fear responses, and more like ly  also to respond to them 
with strong fear responses, than they are when they are 
younger. Because of the growing frequency and strength 
of such fear responses, the development of attachment
to a new figure becomes increasingly difficult towards 
. the end of the firs t year and subsequently.
(v iii) Once a child has become strongly attached to a particular 
figure, he tends to prefer that figure to all others, and 
such preference tends to persist despite separation.
In most species, especially in higher species, e. g . , humans, monkeys, 
dogs, etc, the development of attachment appears to follow a fa ir ly  regular 
epigenetic sequence.
Bowlby distinguishes four main phases in the development of human 
attachment behaviour. The firs t is characterised by an infant’s indiscriminate 
orientation and responsiveness to social stimuli. A t e i^ t  to twelve weeks the 
second phase begins with the appearance of discrimination of one or more 
persons. The third phase usually starts after the sixth month when an infant 
employs signals to remain in proximity to already discriminated persons. Once 
he can crawl, he also uses locomotion. Somewhere after the end of the second 
year, an infant becomes capable of a reciprocal and insightful relationship 
with his caretaliers. Bowlby designates this fourth phase as the "formation 
of a goal-corrected partnership".
Ainsworth (1964) studied the development of attachments among the Ganda 
and subsequently (Ainsworth and Bell, 1969a, 1969b) among middle class 
white Americans. Her ontogenetic sequence and Bowlby's are quite sim ilar. 
Ainsworth noted an absence of social responsiveness during the neonatal 
period. An undiscriminating social responsiveness appeared at about one 
month. Infants were observed to smile to any face in social interaction. 
However, by the third to the fourth month, responsiveness became differential 
and preferential when an infant was in close proxim ity with his caretaking 
figure(s). Smiling, crying, and vocalisation were among the firs t responses 
to become differential and therefore to imply discrimination. A month or so 
la te r, an infant not only greeted his caretalcer when she entered the room 
but also cried when she left. i. e. , he could now be considered differentially  
responsive at a distance. A t around eight months, usually with the onset of
locomotion, Ainsworth dated the firs t occurrence of active initiative on the 
part of the infant and a few weeks la te r, the onset of manifest stranger anxiety.
Sander (1962, 1964) considered the mother-infant dyad as a unit of social 
interaction. He concerned himself not only with attachment behaviour but 
also with its reciprocal compliment, caretaldng behaviour. He described the 
interaction between mother and infant in terms of "Issues", the f irs t of which
centred around "Initial Regulation". By about two and a half or three months 
mother and infant had usually got on some kmd o^schedule and "Reciprocal 
Exchange in Interaction" became the second issue. At the end of the sixth 
month began the third issue , which had as its focus an "Infant's Initiative to 
D irect his Activity" and was followed at about ten months by the fourth issue: 
the "Availability of a Mother to an Infant's Initiative". The last issue concerned 
an infant's "Self-assertion".
Tlie relationship between Bowlby's, AinsworÜi's and Sander's descriptions of 
the developmental sequences is presented below:
AinsworthBowlby 
PHASE I
Orientation and Signals 
witiiout Discrimination  
of Figure 
[0 to 8 or 12 wks]
PHASE n
Orientation and Signals 
Directed towards one (or 
more) Discrim inated  
Figure(s)
[ 2 or 3 to 6 mths ]
PHASE m
Maintenance of Proxim ity  
to a Discrim inated Figure 
by Means of Locomotion 
as well as Signals 
[ 6 or 7 mths on ]
PHASE IV
Formation of a Goal- 
Corrected Partnership 
[ not before 24 mths ]
STAGE I
(a) Neonatal Reflex 
[ 0 to 4 wks ]
(b) Undiscriminating 
social responsiveness 
[ 4 to 8 or 12 wks ]
STAGE n  
Differential
Responsiveness in Close 
Proxim ity to the Mother 
Figure
[ 8 or 12 to 20 or 25 wks ]
STAGE m  
Differential 
Responsiveness at a 
Distance
[ 20 or 25 to 35 wks ] 
STAGE IV
Active Initiative (with 
onset of locomotion)
[ 30 to 35 wks on ]
STAGE V  
Stranger Anxiety 
I 9 mths on ]
Sander 
ISSUE I
In itia l Regulation 




[ 4 to 6 mths ]
ISSUE H I 
Infant's Initiative  
to D irect his Activity 
[ 7 to 9 mths ]
ISSUE IV
Availability of Mother 
to Infant's Initiative  




[ 14 to 20 mths ]
The Development of Perception and of Attachment in the Human Infant compared 
with "Imprinted Recognition of and Response to Specific Patterns of Visual 
Stimulation"
It  w ill be remembered that the mmimal requirements for "imprinting" in 
the more general or extended sense of the concept appear to be (1) a naive 
subject (2) capable of orienting to (3) patterned stimulation (4) which must be 
present (5) during an optimal period for learning.
(1) So fa r , there is absolutely no evidence that requires us to postulate innate ideas, 
nor innate recognition of or response to a specific visual stimulus configuration.
In  short, there can be little  doubt that the partunate is visually naive, (5) a state 
which can be considered optimal for visual learning.
(2) The human partunate vdthdraws from overwhelmingly intense stim uli 
and, of course, does not even respond to stimuli above or below his thesholds 
of attention, but he can and does orientate to stimuli within a certain range, 
though not indiscrim inately. Wolff (1963a) has observed that a high pitched 
brass bell and an audubon bird whistle are in itia lly  as effective as a human 
voice in eliciting smiling, and are more effective than fog horns. In fact
i t  is quite certain that the "normal" fu ll-term  partunate is capable of 
orientating to sources of heterogeneous: stimulation. A ll of the literature  
reviewed in the firs t section presupposes just that ability to orientate.
(3) Perceptual studies indicate that infants orientate "instinctively" to 
patterned stim uli (Fantz, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1966; Berlyne, 1958; Bruner ,1968) 
and "prefer" or fixate longer stimuli which are complex, but not too complex.
In  other words, there is an optimal level of complexity (Herschenson,
Munsinger and Kessen, 1965; Thomas, 1965; Brennan, Ames and Moore, 1965; 
Caron and Caron, 1969; Moffett, 1969; Cohen 1969; Haith, Kessen and Collins, 
1969). M oreover, a moving or varying stimulus, especially one which responds 
to an infant’s own actions, appears to be more attractive than a static or 
unresponsive one (Caron, 1967; Rovee and Rovee, 1969). It  does not need to be 
emphasised that the maternal face constitutes a re latively  complex, (thou^ not 
too complex), interm ittent, responsive stimulus and therefore meets the 
requirements of the stimulus pai^neters to which a neonate can and does 
respond. Therefore, the task is to establish which stim uli are present and 
when. But before continuing, it  pays to remember that it is unnecessary to 
argue for a narrowly defined Innate Releasing Mechanism, as do Lorenz (1935) 
and Gray (1958).
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Since the ability to orient is alone sufficient for imprinting to take place, 
the inability of the human infant to follow poses no genuine problem. The 
functional equation of following and smiling is therefore irrelevant. Neitlier 
movement of the subject nor of the object, thougli advantageous, is sufficient. 
Thus, it  appears possible to draw certain comparisons between the m inim ally  
sufficient conditions in newdy hatched birds for imprinted recognition of a visual 
stimulus and the corresponding conditions under which a human infant grows 
responsive to or attached to the human facial Gestalt. The obvious differences 
between optimal conditions for the different species w ill not be stressed.
(4) The partunate comes equipped with a fixed focal length of approximately 
nineteen centimetres on the average (Haynes, White and Held, 1964).
Therefore, everything beyond about five to ten inches is more or less out of 
focus. Objects or patterns at a distance of two feet or more from a partunate's 
eyes do not exist in tiie practical sense of the word as far as he is concerned. 
Also, very young infants appear to be able to resolve only strong contrasts of 
grey (Nelson, 1968). I t  is as though a neonate views the world through a 
camera fitted with a f ilte r  to reduce patterns to flat areas of black and white. 
Stimuli which are too complex cannot be resolved and therefore are visually  
precluded. Furtherm ore, a neonate is incapable of scanning a stimulus.
Rather, he picks out an attractive part, usually an angular element, on which 
he fixates (Salapatek and Kessen, 1966; Nelson and Kessen, 1969). M oreover, 
i t  appears that neonates are perceptually bound, that is: they are forced to 
look at something and cannot look away (Steclfller and Latz, 1966). In other 
words, there is no problem of divided attention or competing visual stim uli.
Each neonate lives in a very restricted Umwelt (von Uexkiill, 1921, 1934).
His world of experience has been greatly simplified by the above mentioned 
factors. I t  would be poetically accurate to say that he cannot see more than he 
can understand. Thus there are only a lim ited number of visual stimuli which 
in itia lly  impinge upon his naive visual awareness, a state optimal for learning.
In the average expectable enviromnent, the stimulus most frequently to 
penetrate into a neonate's visual Umwelt would be the face of his caretaker.
Spitz (1948, 1959), Benjamin (1963), Ainsworth (1967), Wolff (1963a, 1963b) 
and Sander (1962, 1964) describe the frequency with which and the way in which 
a young infant responds to his mother in the midst of routine care and games.
I t  is therefore quite plausible that the human face is the most constantly
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present stimulus in a neonates restricted visual Umwelt. Casual,naturalistic 
observation indicates that most motliers in itia lly hold their own face about 
six to twelve inches from their infant's eyes when in direct face-to-face  
interaction.
As was indicated above, young infant's "prefer" patterned stimuli to a 
homogeneous field, but they do not scan a figure. Instead, they appear to fix  
upon an attrative part. Moreover, they appear to have a predilection for stimuli 
which are intermediate in complexity and which move or vary. To be sure, the 
human facial Gestalt meets all of these c rite ria , including the criterion of 
"attractive" parts, namely; the eyes (Ambrose, 1963). Therefore, it comes 
as no surprise that the face is the firs t visual stimulus to which an infant 
responds most consistently and most vigorously with differential behaviour , 
and to which he shows the firs t signs of prim itive recognition. I t  is by the 
fourth or fifth week, when an infant is capable of foe all y accommodating to 
changes in distance and of resolving subtler shades of grey, that he has 
become fam ilia r with the human facial Gestalt.
Since a neonate cannot approach or follow locomotorjy, the restriction of 
visual stim uli to which he is exposed increases the probability that extraneous 
stimuli do not interfere witli "exposure learning" and the subsequent infant- 
mother bond. That is: as a consequence of the initial lim itations of an infant's 
visual system, it  is more likely that he w ill become fam iliar with and attached 
to or imprinted to the biologically appropriate class of visual stim uli, i. e. 
the m other’s face. I f  looking is a ll an infant can do and if  the basis of 
"exposure learning" or "imprinted recognition of and response to specific 
patterns of visual stimulation" is looking, then it  is reasonable to assume some 
factor(s), presumably the result of evolutionary selective processes, which 
would lim it  the range of visual stimuli and thereby reduce the likelihood of 
maladaptation or fixation on a biologically inappropriate objects. In short, 
i f  an infant is not to be overwhelmed by the complexity of the visual environment 
and if  the mother's face is to enjoy primacy over other patterned stimulation in 
his visual experience, then not only must he be equipped with a "preference" 
for certain classes of stimulation but also must his visual experience be 
restricted in such a way tliat, in the average expectable environment, 
opportunities to perceive the caretalcer's face would be facilitated while 
opportunities to perceive other classes of stim uli, equally preferable in itia lly , 
would be reduced or even precluded. *
*  I t  is interesting to note that some young infants appear to be attached to or 
"imprinted on" not only the mother's face but also on a teddy bear or on a fflPbHâ '
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Von Uexkull (1921,1934) distinguished between the environment in which 
an organism lives and its Umwelt or phenomenal-subjective "world". Though 
emdronments may overlap, Umwelten do not necessarily. In short, there is 
no single "world" in which all organisms live , for each particular Umwelt 
is a "world" created from  the environment as a result of an interlocking of 
a species'effector and receptor systems. I t  is usually also the "world" to 
which each species is best fitted or adapted.
hi higher organisms, one of the many possible, and perhaps the most 
important of Umwelten is visual. As von Uexkull emphasised, there can be 
little  doubt tliat a visual Umwelt, for instance of either adult or infant human, 
has survival value and is the result of evolutionary selective forces. The 
question is , therefore, whether the restriction of an infant's visual Umwelt 
has an evolutionary function.
It  could be argued that the human infant is bom premature and hence the 
restriction. However, the mechanisms underlying the restriction must not be 
equated with the function of the restriction. I t  could equally well be argued 
that prem aturity had been selected because it ensured restricted vision. The 
question would therefore have to be re-phrased; Does the restriction of an 
infant's vision have survival value for the species ?
If  attachment has the evolutionary function of ensuring survival of the species 
by decreasing the number of young that fa ll prey to predators (Bowlby, 1969), 
then there must be certain mechanisms to malie it  more like ly  that attachment 
takes place. These mechanisms would likewise have been selected phylo­
genetic all y for their contribution to the formations of the infant-mother bond.
Now, it has been shown that the consequence of the restriction is an increase 
in the likelihood that recognition of and attachment to the mother's face w ill 
take place. The issue is^in short, whether this consequence has an 
evolutionary function. Surely, whatever has as its consequence an evolutionary 
function must also be an evolutionary function.
Since tiie human neonate cannot cling, he would have to be carried or held 
in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness and he would usually be held 
in the arms or on the chest. In the firs t case, perception of the mother's face 
would be possible, thou^ not frequently optimal (except when she lowered her 
head); in the la tte r, it  would be impossible. In  short, a young infant would 
spend most of his time looking at and tlie ref ore becoming more fam ilia r with
115
stim uli other than his mother's face. When one considers that in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness, a mother would have to be involved 
with tasks of survival such as food gathering and vigilance for predators, it  
is obvious that her hifant would not receive her exclusive attention and would 
more frequently be exposed to patterns other than her face.
Since the phenomenon of imprinting to visual stimuli is not coterminal 
witii attachment and/or imprinting to auditory and perhaps even to tactile  
stim uli, and since an adult's visual environment is overwhelmingly complex, 
it seems h i^ ily  lilœly that visual preferences for non-human and therefore 
maladaptive objects would be more frequent the degree to which an infant's 
visual Umwelt was complex or offered alternative stimuli to be imprinted 
to. Above a ll, an overly-complex visual "world" would be cognitively 
overwhelming. There is strong evidence (Piaget, 1936, 1937; Hunt, 1970) 
that at least for cognitive functions (one of which is visual perception), there 
is an optimal level of complexity and that whatever is too complex or too 
novel is just not assimilated as such. I f  an infant is to develop, Üiere must 
be an interlocking of his abilities or schemata and what tiiey can handle.
In other words, perceptual and cognitive experiences must be appropriate 
to an infant's stage of development. In short, a prim itive "mind" requires 
restricted experience, otherwise development, and with it  survival, would 
be impossible.
(5) As has been said, an infant's visual system goes through rapid 
development during tlie f irs t month of life . Whereas the partunate could only 
resolve sharp black white contrasts, the four to five week old neonate can 
resolve more intermediate shades of grey and tiierefore more comlex patterns 
(Nelson, 1968). Moreover, it is somewhere aroimd the begimiing of the second 
month, if  not before, that an infant's focal length ceases to be fixed and begins 
to show the firs t signs of accommodating to objects at various distances 
(Haynes, White and Held, 1967). Simultaneously, he begins to make eye-to-eye  
contact and to smile to a non-spealdng face (Wolff, 1963). However, it  is not 
im til tiie fourth or fifth month that an infant's visual system is roughly 
equivalent in functional terms to an adults (Haynes, White and Held, 1965; 
Bower, 1966). , .......
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Fantz (19G3) originally claimed that there was a preference througiiout the 
f irs t six months for a correct arrangement of schematic facial features over 
scrambled. However, data from a subsequent experiment (Fantz, 1965) do 
not appear to support a "preference" for correct arrangement until about the 
second or third month. I f  there is in itia lly  no preference for the facial Gestalt 
and then, two or three months la te r, a preference can be observed, it  would 
be legitimate to assume that some form of learning has taken place. But 
neither Kagan, Henlcer, Hen-Tov, Levine and Lewis (1966), Koopman and 
Ames (1967) nor Wilcox (1969) were able to find a preference for a face­
like  stimulus when an alternative non-face-like stimulus was of equal 
complexity. Nonetheless, a more complete or natural representation of a 
face and/or a pattern with eyes tended to e lic it longer fixations than an 
incomplete or stylized facial pattern, especially without eyes. Significantly 
enough, from  the second month on, most infants can distinguish a three 
dimensional object from  a two dimensional representation of it  and do not 
equate the two (Bower, 1966, 1971). Therefore, it is like ly  that an infant 
eight weeks or older can discriminate a face-like pattern from  an actual 
face, in which case the findings of üie experiments quoted above could not 
be considered as sufficient to provide a basis for conclusions concerning 
infantile perception of the face as a living, three dimensional source of 
stimulation. Fixation, fortunately, is not the only behavioural indication of 
an infant’s perception of the face. Differential social responses can also be 
used.
Spitz (1946, 1948) emphasised the centrality of the eyes in the facial Gestalt 
as a determinant of smiling. Ahrens (1959) subsequently noted that eyes only 
were sufficient to e lic it smiling and that a face wearing false eyes was 
reacted to negatively. Ambrose (1963) considered a mother's eyes to be the 
"human equivalent of what in birds is the 'firs t moving object seen’ ".
In the pilot study, the author noted that a living face which contained eyes as 
well as some other feature(s) was fixated by infants three months or older as 
frequently as a complete face. The use of a living face was advantageous in 
that it  could leave little  doubt of what an infant was actually responding to. 
Results s im ilar to those in the pilot study were found in the main study, in
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which black and white filmed faces constituted the stimulus variables. In 
fact, infants showed to filmed and to real or living faces basically the same
hierarchical ordering of fixation times for various conditions of completeness. 
This fact suggests that the face is recognised as a coherent visual pattern. 
Moreover, the negative reaction to the absence of the eyes suggests not only 
an expectaney of seeing eyes but also an appetitive response to them. Infants 
either cried, covered their eyes or even refused to look to a face which did 
not contain at least one eye. By contrast, the mere presence of an eye or 
of both eyes was sufficient to e lic it contented looking.
In the natural environment,. an infant does not always have the opportunity 
to see a full face. Hats, scarves, or other articles of clothing as well as 
extraneous obstacles can block from view various parts of tlie face. 
Nevertheless, one thing an infant is always certain of perceiving when 
presented with a face is the eyes. People do not usually walk around or engage 
in social interaction with their eyes closed or masked.
The expectancy of seeing eyes, which is inferable from an infant's negative 
reaction to their absence, can be talcen as evidence for internalization or 
learning of that specific stimulus configuration. Equally important is the 
appetitive aspect inferable from  the negative reaction. I t  w ill be recalled  
that one criterion for distinguishing a recognised from  an imprinted object 
was the presence of an appetitive response to the latter.
At the end of the f irs t  quarter, when an infants visual system is rougjily 
equivalent in function terms to an adults, there can be little  doubt that most 
infants respond differentially to and therefore can be said to recognise and to 
prefer their mother (Ainsworth^ 1964 ,1967j Sander, 1962,1964; Ambros^ 
1963, W olff, 1963a,1963b; Shaffer, 1971). Infants approximately sixteen weeks 
old sm ile, vocalise and laugh more frequently to, stop crying more readily for,
and accept food more easily from  a fam ilia r caretaker than from a stranger. 
T h o u ^  few infants show fear of or anxiety to strangers at this tim e, many 
appear to be wary of them (Bronson, 1971). Infants of this age frequently 
watch television and are decidedly interested in m irro rs . In fact, they smile 
coo and wave their arms to multiple images of their own mother in a set of 
m irro rs . This raction demonstrates "that young infants can recognise 
features in recognising their mothers, but they recognise the mother
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as one of many identical mothers" (Bower, 1971). However, infants of twenty 
weeks or older become quite upset at tiie sight of more than one mother, which 
implies tiiey "know they have only one mother". In other words, they no longer 
identify objects with places but with features. Obviously, tiie stimulus 
characteristics of the m other’s face have been internalized. The negative 
reaction to multiple images of one mother can be considered to betray an 
expectancy and an appetitive response comparable with the reaction to a 
face without eyes.
It  is worth emphasising that visual differentiation presupposes recognition 
both logically and ontologically. An infant has to be able to recognise the 
general qualities of a facial Gestalt qua faceness as contrasted with other 
visual G estai ten before he can differentiate a particular facial Gestalt from  
others. Therefore, attachment can be said to presume both recognition and 
differentiation.
As has been argued, imprinting of a young organism to its caretalcer must not 
be confused with imprinting to sexual objects etc. Therefore, imprinted recognition 
of and reaction to a caretaker is to be seen to involve learning of and developing a 
socially appetitive and/or affective response system for a specific object and not for 
a class of objects. "The in itia l learning of the characteristics of the parent is not supra- 
individual learning . . . "  (Hinde, 1963). In short, a young animal, either bird  
or human, becomes attached to or imprinted on the characteristics of a 
particular individual and not of the whole species.
When an infant shows him self capable of recognising the human facial 
Gestalt and especially when capable of differentiating one such Gestalt from  
another, it  can be inferred that he is in possession of an organised memory 
trace of certain coherent configurations. I t  is as though "faceness", and in 
particular one person's face, has been printed in his mind as a standard with 
which he can compare external stim uli and which he can use as a goal in a 
search among them. Moreover^ an infant's response to various combinations 
of facial features as face-like suggests a stamped-in or internalized standard, 
i .e .  a face-schema, in terms of w^hich incomplete facial features are recognised 
to be face-like. Further evidence for a stamped-in schema of the face is 
provided by tiie negative reaction to a face without eyes. That is: infants 
expect and even want to see eyes. Though it  might be argued that a face without
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eyes is an insufficient stimulus, this explanation would fail to take accoimt of 
the facts both that a negative (and not a neutral) reaction was associated with 
the absence of eyes, and that eyes alone were found to constitute a m inim ally  
sufficient stimulus and were even smiled to. Since one eye (preferable two) 
plus some other surrounding features elicited amounts of fixation 
indistinguishable from  tiie full or complete face, it  can be concluded that the 
organisation of the facial Gestalt is best conceived of as a hetergeneous 
summation effect.
Therefore, it seems not unreasonable that four months old infants, have a 
"scan path" (Noton and Stark, 1971) which involves definite "sets" or "goals" 
(M ille r , Galanter and P ribram , I960) when scaiming a stimulus configuration 
which is potentially a face. I t  may even be that the eyes are "privileged 
features" around which the internalization representation of the facial ’
Gestalt is organised.
Obviously, a sixteen to twenty week old infant cannot be considered visually 
naive for ( i)  he shows an ability to recognise and distinguish between human 
facial Gestalten, and (ii) his behaviour betrays a preference or appetitive for  
certain facial Gestalt(en) and a wariness of other. Thus it  would appear that 
something functionally s im ilar to imprinted recognition of and response to the facial 
Gestalthas taken place and that the optimal period for this kind of exposure learning 
is well on its way to termination, if  not, at least in the case of certain infants, 
already terminated.
In summation: "The development of a human mother-infant relationship 
bears many sim ilarities to the analogous process in birds" (Hinde, 1963). For 
instance: "tiie developmental sequence of firs t social response to the parent, then fear, 
and la ter aggression, i s , . ,  s im ilar in birds, anthropoids, , . .  and humans" 
(Hinde, 1961). In  functional term s, "the result of the imprinting process is 
that the young bird [or human infant ] leam s to recognise its mother as an 
individual, and a number of discrete responses made by the young . . .  to its 
mother become integrated on to one object" (Hinde, 1963).
The behaviour of a human infant which has become attached to his mother is 
comparable to the behaviour in birds which is known to be a result of 
imprinting. That is: An infant responds to the face (of his caretaker) qua
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facial Gestalt, as a coherent visual pattern which can be recognised as face­
like , even from only a few features; moreover, his response suggests 
organised memory traces or internalized schemata against which a 
potentially face-lilie stimulus is measured or judged to be face-lilce and with 
which are associated both positive and negative appetitive affects. Above a ll, 
the "inner face" can be considered to constitute a "set-goal" which is highly 
charged with emotion and in terms of which the environment is searched.
The m inim ally sufficient conditions for imprinting in birds have been shown 
to be s im ilar to the conditions present during the development of a human 
infants recognition of and attachment to the facial Gestalt of his m other/ 
caretalier. These conditions are:
(1) a naive subject (2) capable of orientating to (3) patterned stimulation 
(4) which must be present (5) during an optimal period for learning.
I t  was argued (a) that a neonate is visually naive; (b) that a naive state is 
an optimal state for learning; (c) that a neonate inhabits a restricted visual 
Umw^elt due to his lim ited visual abilities; (d) that the restriction of visual 
stim uli occurs when the infant is naive; (e) that as a consequence of the 
restriction there is a higher probability that exposure learning w ill occur 
to a biologically appropriate object than to an inappropriate;
(f) that a neonate has been equipped by evolution with an unconditioned response 
to orientate to patterned stimuli; (g) that the optimal visual stimulus to penetrate 
into that restricted Umwelt is the human face; (h) that the visual stimulus to 
penetrate most frequently into that restricted Umwelt is also the human face; (i) that 
though a neonate shows no preferential response to the face before one month, 
he does so thereafter with increasing intensity; (j) that by four months, when 
an infant's visual system is functionally the equivalent of an adult's, he 
demonstrates differential responsiveness to and appetitive behaviour for 
real face; (k) that the differential response can be considered to indicate a 
"stamping-in" or internalization of a "face schema" in an infant's "mind";
(1) that the socially appetitive nature of the response to the human face is different 
from most other forms of learning, though sim ilar to imprinting; (m) that from the 
fourth month on, an infant becomes progressively more responsive to particular 
face(s); (n) that soon after an infant becomes responsive to particular faces, 
he differentiates tliose faces from other or non-fam iliar faces; (o) that a 
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